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The optimal compensation contract is a very important issue for firms. Some
empirical findings of wage structure in internal labor market are puzzling. For
example, why are the compensation of workers more compressed than pre-
dicted by the classical theories? Why is the wage structure convex in hierar-
chical firms? This dissertation explores various important factors which may
affect the optimal contract in the internal labor market.
The first chapter characterizes the optimal contract when workers in the
workplace care not only about their own wage but also their co-workers’ wage.
Specifically, I assume that workers are inequity averse to their wage differentials
or they are status seeking. Building on the inequity aversion model of Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), I derive that the optimal wage structure is more compressed
with inequity averse workers than with the standard workers. Inequity aver-
sion among workers can also help explain the internal organization of the firms.
For example, inequity aversion among workers may lead firms to employ only
high productivity workers, even though the marginal product of a low produc-
tivity worker is higher than the worker’s marginal cost.
Chapter 2 examines two possible realistic explanations for the convex wage
structure in the hierarchical firms. Based on the multi-round tournament model
of Rosen (1986), we incorporate heterogeneous stage effects. The first exten-
sion that can generate the convex wage structure is that the number of workers
competing increases with the hierarchical levels. The second explanation is that
the returns to effort increase with the hierarchical levels, which cannot generate
the convex wage structure unless further assumptions added on optimal effort
levels and cost functions.
The third chapter investigates the underlying assumption in Chapter 1 that
people are inequity averse to ex-ante payoff differentials. Specifically, an online
survey is conducted to test whether ex ante or ex post fairness views affect peo-
ple’s decision making in a social context. I find that the ex post fairness views do
make an important role in people’s decision making. The results of the survey
data do not support the model of inequity aversion.
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CHAPTER 1
CONTRACTING WITH INEQUITY-AVERSE WORKERS WITH
HETEROGENEOUS PRODUCTIVITIES
1.1 Introduction
In the workplace, people have heterogeneous productivities. The classical the-
ory assumes that workers are self-interested. Therefore, risk-neutral workers
should be paid according to their own marginal productivities. Also, as long as
there is no spillover between efforts, it should not matter how firms organize
teams of workers with heterogeneous productivities. However, these predic-
tions do not match real world phenomena, i.e., actual wages are more com-
pressed but still increase with workers’ productivity (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).
And how teams are organized based on workers’ productivities does affect prof-
its (Frank, 1984a and 1984b). Furthermore, the classical theory cannot explain
adopted wage secrecy policies (Dickens and Katz, 1986, and Krueger and Sum-
mers, 1988) and the consistent wage differentials across industries.
This chapter suggests an explanation for the above phenomena by incor-
porating other-regarding preferences into the standard principal-agent model.
Other-regarding preferences have been widely documented in numerous ex-
perimental and empirical studies.1 The theories of social preferences assume
that a person does not only care about his own material payoff but may also be
concerned about the material payoff other people receive. I follow Fehr and
Schmidt’s inequity aversion model because of its simplicity and tractability.
1See Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a comprehensive survey. According to their survey, there
are three classes of other-regarding preferences: social preferences, interdependent preferences
and intention based reciprocity.
1
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that a person dislikes an inequitable or un-
fair outcome. Specifically, a person is compassionate or altruistic towards other
people (also known as aversion to advantageous inequity), if others’ material
payoffs are below an equitable benchmark. In addition, a person is envious of
other people (also known as aversion to disadvantageous inequity) if others’
material payoffs exceed the equitable benchmark level.2
In this model, I analyze an optimal contract design problem under a monop-
olistic setting where a risk-neutral principal (she) has a project and needs to hire
two risk-neutral agents with different productivities. I assume that the principal
knows workers’ productivities and preferences, i.e., no asymmetric information.
I also assume that an agent is inequity averse to wage differences and his ref-
erence group is his co-worker. If his wage is higher than his co-worker’s, then
he suffers disutility from compassion. On the other hand, if his wage is lower
than his coworker’s wage, he is envious of his coworker. I show that inequity
aversion affects the ability of the firm to incentivize the workers through wages.
In the benchmark model, I study the optimal contract design with two
purely self-interested agents.3 The first result is that a worker’s wage should
be based solely on that worker’s own productivity. With the optimal contract,
the principal’s profit is maximized while leaving agents with zero rent. This out-
come is socially efficient, where a high productivity worker exerts more effort
than a low productivity worker. I refer to this force as the efficiency motive for
the firm, which is measured by workers’ productivity differences. The efficiency
2When terms such as ”equitable”, ”altruism”, ”compassion” or ”envy” are used here, I dis-
regard any moral philosophical meanings and emotions associated with them as well as any
normative implications. I view them as purely positive terms that describe behavior (the same
as discussed in Fehr and Schmidt, 2006).
3If the principal can contract with two independent contractors, which means two agents
can’t compare their payoffs, then inequity aversion doesn’t matter.
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motive causes wage differentials because a high productivity agent should be
paid more in order to induce more effort than a low productivity agent. The
stronger the efficiency motive, the greater the wage differential. I also define
the optimal effort level as the first best effort level, which can be obtained by lin-
ear wage contracts. As shown in section 2, the power of incentives is the same
for both agents. Therefore, I can obtain the second standard result that optimal
effort levels can also be implemented by selling the project to two workers.
With inequity-averse agents and the optimal wage contract of the bench-
mark model, inequity aversion affects the ability of the firm to incentivize the
workers through wages. Furthermore, the principal is worse off with inequity-
averse workers, because to induce the same amount of effort as in the bench-
mark case, the principal has to pay workers more than the benchmark case be-
cause wage differences incur negative utility to workers with different wages.
The first best effort levels of the benchmark model are no longer profit max-
imizing. I refer to this force as the equality motive for the firm, which states
that workers should be paid similarly because workers dislike wage differen-
tials. The equality motive is composed of two concerns. Suppose worker 1 is
paid more than worker 2. The compassion concern results from the disutility of
worker 1 when he is paid more. The envy concern arises from the disutility of
worker 2 when he is paid less. Both the compassion concern and the envy con-
cern induce the form to offer similar wages to each worker ex post. As shown
in section 2, it is always optimal to pay a high productivity worker more than or
the same as a low productivity worker. Therefore, when the principal consid-
ers the equality motive, she only needs to consider the compassion from a high
productivity worker and the envy from a low productivity worker.
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When a principal faces inequity-averse workers, she must balance the ef-
ficiency motive and the equality motive. The two motives work in opposite
directions. If workers’ inequity aversion is large, i.e., the equality motive is
strong, it is optimal for the principal to pay equal wages. On the other hand, if
workers’ productivity differences are large and their inequity aversion is small,
i.e., the efficiency motive is strong, it is optimal to offer a high productivity
worker more than a low productivity worker. Because of the equality motive,
i.e., the compassion concern from a high productivity worker and the envy con-
cern from a low productivity worker, however, the optimal wages are still more
compressed than with standard agents. Therefore, with other-regarding prefer-
ences, a worker’s wage is not only dependent on his own productivity but also
depends on his co-worker’s productivity. The model offers one explanation for
the wage compression phenomenon in internal labor markets.4
For the same contract, the power of incentives is different for inequity-averse
agents from the power of incentives for standard agents. In other words, in-
equity aversion affects the power of incentives in a contract. Specifically, a high
productivity worker’s optimal effort level decreases with the envy concern and
the compassion concern, while a low productivity worker’s optimal effort level
increases with the envy concern and the compassion concern. If I fix the produc-
tivity differential and increase inequity aversion i.e., raise the inequity aversion
parameters, a high productivity worker’s effort level falls, while a low produc-
4There are many other explanations for wage compression in the literature. Lazear and
Rosen (1981) suggest that it is prohibitively costly to measure the individual productivity in
some cases. Stiglitz (1975) argues that agents are more risk averse than the firms. Harris and
Holmstrom (1982) offer the insurance explanation. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) develops an fair
wage-effort hypothesis. Frank (1984b) argues status seeking workers are self-sorting. Lazear
(1989) argues that wage compression results from the importance of cooperation between work-
ers. Alternatively, our paper uses inequity aversion model, initially formulated by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999). The notion of our model is closest in spirit to Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and
Frank (1984a, 1984b).
4
tivity worker’s effort level rises until they are equal. Therefore, efforts are more
compressed. As shown in section 2, when the equality motive is very strong,
the optimal effort levels will be the same for the workers. When the efficiency
motive is strong, the efforts of workers will be different reflecting their produc-
tivities, but will still be more compressed than in the benchmark model. As
in the benchmark model, the principal can apply linear wage contracts to im-
plement the optimal effort levels. Unlike the benchmark model, however, the
principal applies a high powered incentive to a low productivity agent and a
low powered incentive contract to a high productivity agent. In addition, the
optimal efforts cannot be implemented by selling the project to the workers.
I also discuss a second case with status-seeking agents. As pointed out by
Frank (1984a, 1984b), some people obtain intrinsic value from non-pecuniary
elements of compensation such as higher positions in the income hierarchies of
the group. In the context of the model, status-seeking workers derive utility
when they are paid more than their co-workers. The principal now can im-
plement any effort level with a status-seeking agent using a lower wage than
with an inequity-averse agent. Therefore, it is optimal for the principal to pay a
status-seeking agent more to induce a much greater effort level than she would
pay to an inequity-averse agent. I refer to this force as the status seeking con-
cern, which leads to wage differentials. Hence, the model with status-seeking
agents yields a key trade-off between the efficiency motive, the status seeking
concern and the envy concern. The first two concerns lead to wage differentials
and the last concern leads to wage compression. If the status seeking concern
is not strong, the results of wage and effort compression still hold. However,
if the status seeking concern is strong, the workers’ wage distribution is more
dispersed than that of the benchmark case.
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Building on the above basic model, I also discuss the issue of optimal inter-
nal organization of the firms by endogenizing the number of workers.5 When
inequity aversion of workers is considerably large, the principal would rather
hire one agent instead of two agents. This result has implications on the effi-
cient scale of the firms without assuming spillover between the projects within
the firms. I also discuss the sorting problem when the principal faces multiple
agents. The principal prefers agents with the same productivity working to-
gether if agents are inequity averse. But with strong status-seeking agents, the
principal combines a high productivity worker with a low productivity worker.
This can imply that even if a task can be accomplished by a high productivity
agent, the principal can gain more profit by hiring one more low productivity
agent by exploiting the high-productivity status-seeking agent.
In extension of the basic model, I consider synergies between the workers
and study the interaction between synergies and inequity aversion. Especially,
I discuss the case that synergies take the form of marginal effect or the synergies
enter the first order conditions of the workers (as opposed to a level effect of syn-
ergies that would not)6. Under this circumstance, an increase in one worker’s
effort can raise the marginal productivity of another worker, then synergies re-
duce marginal productivity differentials and mitigate inequity aversion among
workers. Therefore, synergies provide another explanation for teamwork with
inequity-averse workers.
The chapter has several empirical implications and applications in internal
organizations. When firms design compensation structures, they need to con-
5There is a vast literature explaining firms’ optimal internal organizations including models
of spillovers between workers, property rights and incomplete information structures.
6The synergies with marginal effects here can also be called strategic complements in the
literature. See Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).
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sider inequity aversion among workers. For example, if a firm wants to merge
two sectors (or one firm wants to acquire another firm), which are paid very dif-
ferently, the firm should consider inequity aversion among workers in the two
sectors. If inequity aversion is strong, the high-pay sector will be demotivated
by the low-pay sector. Therefore the merger may decrease the firm’s profit. My
finding is consistent with the fact that long-run performances of many acquir-
ing firms after mergers are poor (Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker, 1992), because
many merger decisions may ignore inequity aversion among workers and only
focus on production efficiency. The chapter can generate empirical predictions
about the types of workers and optimal payment structure. For example, for
some firms with strong status-seeking agents, the wages should be more di-
verse than wages of inequity-averse agents in some firms. This prediction helps
explain the diverse payment structures in labor markets.
This chapter could also shed light on empirical evidence about the issue of
wage secrecy.7 In the standard model, wage secrecy policies have no impact
on the effort levels and firms’ profits. This model implies that a wage secrecy
policy is more profitable for a firm with inequity-averse agents. And it predicts
that with a wage secrecy policy the wages are more diverse than without a wage
secrecy policy.8 On the contrary, with status-seeking agents the principal may
want to adopt a wage transparency policy to gain more profit from a high pro-
ductivity agent. Usually the pay structure is more transparent in public sectors
or in nonprofit organizations; therefore, the wage distribution should be more
compressed than in private sectors. This result is consistent with empirical ev-
7Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) propose that with a wage secrecy policy, managers can
lead a ”quiet” life without any complaints about wage inequality. Danziger and Katz (1997)
suggest that wage secrecy enhances the feasibility of risk-shifting contracts by reducing effective
labor mobility.
8While other papers on behavioral contract theory assume workers compare their rent, there
is scarce discussion on how wage secrecy policies would impact the optimal wage contracts.
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idence. For example, Borjas (2002) uses data from the U.S. Decennial Census
and the Current population to show that since 1970, the wage distribution in
the public sector is significantly more compressed than in the private sectors.
The rest of Chapter 1 is organized as follows. The basic model is presented
and analyzed in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 investigates the related issues such as
sorting. Section 1.4 discusses some extensions of the basic model such as incor-
porating synergies in the production in agents’ preferences. Section 1.5 presents
the related literature. Section 1.6 concludes and discusses the robustness of the
results. Most proofs are relegated to the appendix.
1.2 Model setup
Suppose a principal (she) has a project that requires two agents to complete.
Agents are denoted by {1, 2}. Assume that agent i′s production yi is linear in
his effort ei: yi = biei + i, i = 1, 2, where i is an independent and identically
distributed noise variable with zero mean and its density function is f (). bi
measures agent i’s productivity. Assume that agents are heterogeneous in pro-
ductivities. Without loss of generality let b1 > b2. For both agents, the amount of
effort e incurs the same convex cost function c(e) = e
2
2 . Assume that both agents’
reservation utility is U = 0. The principal can observe the output level of each
agent but not the effort level; therefore, only outputs are contractible. I also as-
sume the principal and agents are risk neutral to focus on the inequity aversion
instead of risk sharing.
The model is a standard principal-agent setup: the principal offers a wage
contract and agents choose whether to accept or reject the offer. If an agent
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accepts the wage offer, he chooses an effort level and receives a payment ac-
cording to the contract. I first introduce the concept of inequity aversion. Then I
derive the optimal contracts in a special case when the inequity aversion among
workers is zero, which I also refer to as the benchmark case with purely self-
interested agents. Then I model the case with inequity-averse agents and com-
pare key differences between the optimal contracts under the benchmark model
and the model with inequity aversion.
1.2.1 Inequity aversion
There are many ways to model other-regarding preferences. For example, Ra-
bin (1993) develops the intention-based approach to model the interdependent
preference (Also see Charness and Rabin (2002), Cox and Friedman (2002) and
Levine (1998)). In this chapter, I apply Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) inequity aver-
sion model, because of its tractability and simplicity. Specifically, when there
are two people, the utility function for person i is
Ui(x) = xi − αimax{x j − xi, 0} − βimax{xi − x j, 0}
where βi ≤ αi and 0 ≤ βi < 1, i , j. In this function, the first term xi is the
person i′s payoff, and the second and third terms capture person i′s inequity
aversion (fairness concern). αi measures the degree of envy (aversion to disad-
vantageous inequality) and βi measures the degree of compassion (aversion to
advantageous inequality). If person i′s payoff is less than person j, xi < x j, the
utility loss from envy is αi(x j − xi). If person i′s payoff is greater than person j,
xi > x j, the utility loss from compassion is βi(xi−x j). βi ≤ αi captures the idea that
people suffer more from disadvantageous inequity than from advantageous in-
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equity. In this chapter, I also assume 0 < βi < 12 .
9 When agents are status seeking,
βi < 0, which I discuss later. I use the terms ”envy” and ”compassion” because
they may be one of the natural sources driving inequity aversion. But as men-
tioned in the introduction, ”envy” and ”compassion” are used in a neutral way
to describe behaviors and this model can also be driven by other aspects such
as moral concern or altruism. In other words, the emotions associated with the
terms and normative implications are completely disregarded in this model.
There are two important questions concerning this other-regarding utility
function in the setting of my model. First, with which reference group does person
i compare himself? For example, for a principal, the reference group can be his
subordinate, while for a worker the reference group can be co-workers or his
boss.10 In this model, I assume a worker’s reference group is his co-worker.11
Second, what do workers compare, or in other words what does x stand for?
The comparison could be between wages w, effort levels e, costs of effort c(e) or
rents, (u(w) − c(e)). In this model, I assume workers are inequity averse to their
ex-ante wage differentials,12 but the results are robust if workers are inequity
averse to the effort cost differentials, which will be checked in the appendix.
The assumption of inequity aversion to wage differentials might be reasonable
when workers can observe their co-workers’ wages but not their effort levels or
9If β > 12 , the person is better off by giving his payment to his reference group, when Ui =
(1 − β)xi + βx−i. In other words, the person cares more than his reference group than himself,
which is implausible in workplaces.
10Some papers take peers or teammates as their reference group. For example, Thakor and
Goel (2005) studies the optimal contracts when agents envy each other. Some papers consider
the case in which an agent compares his payoff with the principal’s payoff (Dur and Glazer
(2005) and Englmaier and Wambach (2010))
11See Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a comprehensive survey of the literature.
12There is very scarce experimental and field evidence that differentiates between inequity
aversion to ex-ante wage differences and ex-post wage differences. While most literature as-
sumes that workers are inequity averse to ex post wage difference, the ex-ante comparison can
greatly simplify our analysis.
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even when workers can’t observe but can estimate their co-workers’ wages.
From the above discussions, the utility function of agent i is
EUi = wi − c(ei) − αimax(Ew j − Ewi, 0) − βimax(Ewi − Ew j, 0)
Suppose there are two agents {1, 2} and agent 1 earns higher expected wage
than agent 2, i.e. Ew1 > Ew2, agent 1’s compassion parameter β1 comes to play
in his utility function, while agent 2’s envy parameter α2 takes effect in his util-
ity function. Agent 1’s expected utility is EU1 = (1 − β1)Ew1 + β1Ew2 − c(e1) and
agent 2’s expected utility is EU2 = −α2Ew1+(1+α2)Ew2−c(e2). Therefore, given a
contract, for agent i only envy concern αi or only compassion concern βi matters
instead of both. As shown later, the optimal contract only depends on two pa-
rameters: envy of one agent (ai) and compassion of the other agent (β j), instead
of four parameters (ai, βi, a j, β j).
1.2.2 Benchmark model (with no inequity aversion)
In this section, I discuss the benchmark model with purely self-interested
agents: i.e., αi = βi = 0, for i = 1, 2. I assume there is no hidden information and
the principal knows the productivity of each agent. The principal implements
the optimal efforts from workers to maximize her expected profit by offering
optimal wage contract {w1(x1, x2),w2(x1, x2)}.
The principal’s maximization problem becomes
11
max
ei,wi(·)
E(x1 + x2 − w1(x1, x2) − w1(x1, x2))
s.t E(wi(xi, x j) − c(ei)) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2,i , j (IRi)
ei ∈ argmax E(wi(xi, x j) − c(ei)), i = 1, 2, i , j (ICi)
Solving the problem, I derive the following proposition 1-1 (the superscript
B denotes the optimal variables in the benchmark case),
Proposition 1-1 With a standard agent i, i = 1, 2., the principal induces the efficient
effort level eBi = bi with expected wage Ew
B
i =
b2i
2 . The expected profit earned by
the principal is EΠB = b
2
1
2 +
b22
2 . The principal can implement the optimal effort
levels by a linear independent wage contract: wBi = xi − b
2
i
2 , i = 1, 2.
Participation constraints are binding for both agents, because the principal
knows the productivities of workers and leaves zero rent for the agents. The op-
timal effort level of agent i depends solely on his own productivity: eBi = bi. The
result shows that a high productivity agent should exert more effort than a low
productivity agent. I refer to this force as the efficiency motive, because it max-
imizes the total social surplus. The efficiency motive is measured by productiv-
ity differentials. The efficiency motive is strong when agent 1 and agent 2 differ
greatly in productivities. Agent i is expected to receive wage EwBi =
b2i
2 , i = 1, 2,
which is solely dependent on his own productivity. The efficiency motive in-
dicates that a high productivity worker is expected to be paid more than a low
productivity worker; therefore, the efficient effort levels are achieved. When the
efficiency motive is strong, the expected wage differential (EwB1 − EwB2 = b
2
1
2 −
b22
2 )
is greater.
The socially efficient effort levels can be attained by a linear form of wage
contract: wi(xi) = aixi + ti, where ai is the marginal bonus payment and measures
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the marginal power of incentives. ti is the transfer or the base payment. From
the incentive constraints, I can solve for the optimal linear wage contract:
wi = xi − b
2
i
2
The optimal marginal power of incentives is the same for both agents: ai =
1. Because agents are risk neutral, I can interpret the optimal contract as the
principal selling the projects to agent 1 for b
2
1
2 and to agent 2 for
b22
2 so that agents
are the residual claimants on the output.
In fact the benchmark model also applies to the following two cases with
inequity-averse agents. One is that the principal can contract with two inde-
pendent contractors. Therefore she can avoid wage comparisons between the
agents. The other is that the agent cannot observe his co-worker’s wage so there
is no inequity aversion in this case. For example, a company’s wage privacy pol-
icy, even with inequity-averse agents will reduce inequity concern.
1.2.3 Model with inequity aversion
In this part, I assume that agents have heterogenous inequity aversion param-
eters because I want to analyze which inequity aversion parameters of which
workers affect the optimal contract design. The timeline of the setting is the
same as in the benchmark case. There is no asymmetric information between
workers and the principal; i.e., the principal observes the productivities bi and
inequity aversion parameters αi and βi, i = 1, 2.
The principal’s profit maximization problem becomes
13
max
w1,w2
E(x1 + x2 − w1 − w2)
s.t Ewi − c(ei) − αimax(Ew j − Ewi, 0) − βimax(Ewi − Ew j, 0) ≥ 0 (IRi)
ei ∈ argmax Ewi − c(ei) − αmax(Ew j − Ewi, 0) − βmax(Ewi − Ew j, 0) (ICi)
To solve for the optimal contract, I first prove the following Lemma 1-1.
Lemma 1-1 Any effort levels (e˜1, e˜2) can be implemented by an independent linear
wage contract w(xi) = aixi + ti.
Proof: Suppose (e˜1, e˜2) are a pair of efforts that the principal wants to imple-
ment. Consider the linear wage contractswi(xi) = aixi+ti, i = 1, 2. Let ai = e˜i/bi, i =
1, 2, and choose (t1, t2) to satisfy a1b1e˜1 + t1 = a2b2e˜2 + t2 ≥ max(c(e˜1), c(e˜2)). It is
straightforward to prove that the constructed equal wage contracts can imple-
ment the effort levels. Analogously, I can also construct an unequal wage con-
tract to implement the effort levels too. (for example let a1 = e˜1/(b1(1 − β1)), a2 =
e˜2/(b2(1+α1)), and choose (t1, t2) to satisfy a1b1e˜1+t1 > a2b2e˜2+t2 ≥ max(c(e˜1), c(e˜2)).
Lemma 1-2 Individual rationality constraints IRi, i = 1, 2 are binding for both agents
for optimal wage contracts.
Proof: I only need to consider the linear wage contracts: wi(xi) = aixi + ti,
i = 1, 2. Suppose neither (IRi) constraints are binding, I can decrease t1 and t2
by a small amount 4 simultaneously so that IR constraints still hold. Because
IC constraints remain the same, the new contract can increase profit. Therefore
at least one IR constraint is binding. Suppose that IR1 is binding and IR2 is not
binding. If Ew1 > Ew2 and w1 = a1x1 + t1,w2 = a2x2 + t2. I can choose a new
contract w1 = a˜1x1 + t˜1,w2 = a˜2x2 + t˜2 (a1 > a˜1 and a˜2 > a2) so that IR constrants are
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still satisfied but more profit can be earned. Analogously, I can prove for other
cases such as Ew1 = Ew2.13
Under this monopolistic setting, the principal pays workers just the amount
to compensate their effort costs and leave agents with zero rent. Intuitively, if
one of the IR constraints is not binding, I can find another more compressed
wage contract (or equally compressed if the nonbinding-IR contract is already
an equal wage contract) to increase the profit.
From Lemma 1-2, I can derive the following Corollary 1-1.
Corollary 1-1 Ew1 R Ew2,if and only if e1 R e2.
Now I can solve for the optimal contracts. Intuitively, inequity aversion re-
duces the wage differentials between the workers. I refer to this force as the
equality motive. The higher the values of inequity aversion parameters, the
stronger the equality motive. To maximize profit, the principal needs to balance
the trade-off between the efficiency motive and the equality motive. When the
equality motive is strong, it is optimal for the principal to apply an equal wage
contract. On the other hand, when the efficiency motive is strong, it is optimal
for the principal to apply an unequal wage contract.
I first solve for the case of an equal wage contract and the case of an unequal
wage contract. Then I compare the principal’s profits in two cases. Thus I can
get the optimal contract as a function of exogenous parameters. Add superscript
e to equilibrium variables when the optimal contract is equal wage contract and
13An alternative proof can be found in the appendix.
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add the superscript u to the variables when the optimal contract is an unequal
wage contract.
Equal wage contract
When the principal offers an equal wage contract, Ew1 = Ew2, there is no disutil-
ity from wage comparisons between the workers. From Lemma 1-2, the partici-
pation constraints are binding for both agents, i.e., Ewi = c(ei), i = 1, 2. Therefore,
the equal wage contract implements an equal effort level e1 = e2. The principal’s
profit maximization problem now becomes
max
e1,e2
b1e1 + b2e2 − (e1)
2
2
− (e2)
2
2
s.t e1 = e2
Solving this problem yields the following lemma, where I add the super-
script e to the variables associated with the optimal equal wage contract.
Lemma 1-3 If an equal wage contract is optimal, the optimal effort levels are the same
ee1 = e
e
2 =
b1+b2
2 ; the expected wages are the same Ew1 = Ew2 =
(b1+b2)2
8 . The
principal earns profit Πe = 14 (b1 + b2)
2 .
As shown in Lemma 1-1, the optimal equal effort levels can be implemented
by the independent linear wage contract below
wi(xi) = aixi + ti, where aei =
b1 + b2
2bi
and tei = −
(b1 + b2)2
8
, i = 1, 2.
Because b1 > b2, the power of incentives is higher for a low productivity worker
than a high productivity worker: ae1 =
b1+b2
2b1
< ae2 =
b1+b2
2b2
. Because ae1 < 1 < a
e
2,
unlike in the benchmark case, the principal finds it suboptimal to sell the project
to the agents, even when the agents are risk neutral.
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Unequal wage contract
The following lemma describes the optimal wage contract if the optimal ex-
pected wages are not equal. I add superscript u to the variables associated with
the optimal unequal wage contract.
Lemma 1-4 When b1 > 1+2α21−2β1 b2, if an unequal wage contract is optimal, the principal
can implement optimal effort levels eu1 =
1+α2−β1
1+2α2
b1 and eu2 =
1+α2−β1
1−2β1 b2 with profits
Πu =
1+α2−β1
2 (
(b1)2
1+2α2
+
(b2)2
1−2β1 ).
When Ew1 > Ew2, from Lemma 1-2 and Corollary 1-1, I can derive the op-
timal effort levels eu1 =
1+α2−β1
1+2α2
b1 and eu2 =
1+α2−β1
1−2β1 b2. The expected wage con-
tracts are Ewu1 =
1
2
(1+α2−β1)(1+α2)
(1+2α2)2
(b1)2 − 12 (1+α2−β1)β1(1−2β1)2 (b2)2 and Ewu2 = 12
(1+α2−β1)α2
(1+2α2)2
(b1)2 +
1
2
(1+α2−β1)(1−β1)
(1−2β1)2 (b2)
2. The unequal effort levels are attained under the condition
Ewu1 > Ew
u
2, i.e., b1 <
1+2α2
1−2β1 b2. Analogously, when Ew1 < Ew2, I can also derive
the optimal effort levels. However, the corresponding expected wage condition
Ewu1 < Ew
u
2 violates the assumption b1 > b2. Hence the principal would never
pay a low productivity worker more than a high productivity worker. This re-
sult shows that the principal only considers two inequity aversion parameters:
the envy concern (α2) from a low productivity worker and the compassion con-
cern (β1) from a high productivity worker.
As shown by Lemma 1-1, the independent linear wage contract wi(xi) = aixi+
ti, i = 1, 2 can implement the optimal unequal effort levels, where au1 =
1+α2−β1
(1+2α2)(1−β1)
and au2 =
1+α2−β1
(1−2β1)(1+a2) . I can derive that the marginal power of incentives of a high
productivity worker is lower than the marginal power of incentives of a low
productivity worker: au1 < 1 < a
u
2, which is the same as in the equal wage con-
tract.
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Optimal contract
Now I can compare the profits under the equal wage contract and the unequal
wage contract. Not surprisingly, Πu − Πe ≥ 0 if b1 > 1+2α21−2β1 b2, and the amount of
profit levels are equal when b1 = 1+2α21−2β1 b2. Therefore, when b1 >
1+2α2
1−2β1 b2, the prin-
cipal chooses the unequal wage contract. When b2 < b1 ≤ 1+2α21−2β1 b2, the principal
chooses the equal wage contract.
Summing up the above results, I have the following proposition:
Proposition 1-2 A principal contracts with two inequity-averse agents with heteroge-
neous productivities b1 > b2. Let b2 = 1+2α21−2β1 b2.
1. When b1 ≤ b2, the optimal effort levels are the same and the principal chooses
an equal wage contract.
2. When b1 > b2, the optimal effort levels are different and the principal chooses
an unequal wage contract.
In both of the above cases, the principal earns less profit than in the benchmark case
with standard agents. Moreover, effort levels and wage levels are more compressed
than those of the benchmark.
The critical value b2 = 1+2α21−2β1 b2 determines whether the principal should
choose an equal wage contract or an unequal wage contract.
Let us analyze the interaction between the efficiency motive and the equal-
ity motive. Fix the productivity levels b1 and b2 and vary the inequity aversion
parameters α2 and β1. For small values of α2 and β1 satisfying b1 > b2, or when
the inequity aversion parameters are small relative to the productivity differen-
tial, the principal will deviate from the benchmark model by compressing effort
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levels because of the equality motive. The contract decreases the effort level of
a high productivity worker from eB1 = b1 to e
u
1 =
1+α2−β1
1+2α2
b1 and increases the effort
level of a low productivity worker from eB2 = b2 to e
u
2 =
1+α2−β1
1−2β1 b2. I also find
that Ewu1 < Ew
B
1 and Ew
u
2 > Ew
B
2 . To sum up, the efforts and wages are more
compressed with inequity-averse agents: e
u
1−eu2
eB1−eB2
< 1 and Ew
u
1−Ewu2
EwB1−EwB2
< 1.
As the inequity aversion parameters α2 and β1 increase and satisfy the equal-
ity b1 = b2, I have eu1 =
1+α2−β1
1+2α2
b1 =
1+α2−β1
1−2β1 b2 = e
u
2. In this case, the optimal unequal
wage contract is not feasible for the principal. Therefore, when b1 < b2, i.e.,
the efficiency motive is strong, the principal chooses an equal wage contract to
implement the equal effort levels ee1 = e
e
2 =
b1+b2
2 . The wage levels and effort lev-
els are more compressed than in the unequal wage contract or the benchmark
model.
From the optimal contract design, not all inequity aversion parameters mat-
ter. Only compassion concern β1 of the high productivity worker and envy
concern α2 of the low productivity worker take effect on the optimal contract
design.
Comparisons with the benchmark model and some comparative statics
For this section, I compare differences between key variables in the benchmark
model and the model with inequity-averse agents. In addition, I analyze the
impact of inequity aversion on the optimal contract.
Figure 1-1 shows the relationship between optimal expected wages in the
benchmark model and the optimal expected wages with inequity-averse agents,
when I fix b2, β1 and α2 and vary b1. The two solid line segments describe the op-
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timal expected wage levels with standard agents. The differential between the
two solid line segments shows the expected wage differential in the benchmark
case. The dashed line denotes the expected wage levels with inequity-averse
agents. b2 is the critical value determining when the principal should apply an
equal wage contract and an unequal wage contract.
When b1 < b2 or the equality motive is strong, the optimal wage levels are the
same for both agents, which is represented by the thin dashed line. When b1 >
b2, or the efficiency motive is strong, the optimal wage levels start to diverge as
b1 increases, which is presented by two thick dashed lines Ewu1 and Ew
u
2. As can
be seen, the optimal wage levels are more compressed with the inequity averse
agents than with standard agents.
Figure 1-2 describes the optimal effort levels when I fix b2, β1 and α2; and
vary b1. The upper solid line and the lower flat solid line depict the effort level
for the high productivity worker 1 and for the low productivity worker 2 respec-
tively. The dotted line denotes the optimal effort levels with inequity aversion.
When b1 is small, or b2 < b1 < b2, the equal effort contract is optimal, which
is described by the thin dotted segment. When b1 goes above the threshold b2,
the unequal effort contract is optimal, which is described by the two thick dot-
ted segments. It can be clearly seen that the dashed line lies in between the
two solid lines, which implies that the effort levels are more compressed with
inequity-averse agents than with standard agents.
The following proposition describes the effects of compassion (β1) and envy
(α2) on the optimal effort levels (e1, e2).
Proposition 1-3 When the optimal wage contract is an unequal wage contract, then
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1 If β1 increases, then eu1 decreases and e
u
2 increases.
2 If α2 increases, then eu1 decreases and e
u
2 increases.
Proof: eu1 =
1+α2−β1
1+2α2
b1 and eu2 =
1+α2−β1
1−2β1 b2. It is straightforward to show that
∂eu1
∂β1
< 0,
∂eu1
∂α2
< 0,
∂eu2
∂β1
> 0, and
∂eu2
∂α2
> 0.
The comparative statics analysis shows that the optimal effort of a high pro-
ductivity agent decreases in β1 and α2, while the optimal effort of a low produc-
tivity agent increases in β1 and α2. For the same contract, the envy α2 directly
increases the marginal incentive of agent 2 compared with the benchmark case,
thus increasing the effort level of agent 2. α2 indirectly decreases agent 1’s ef-
fort through agent 1’s compassion towards agent 2. The compassion β1 directly
reduces the marginal incentive of agent 1 compared with the benchmark case,
thus reducing the optimal effort level of agent 1. Lowering worker 1’s wage re-
duces worker 2’ disutility from comparison; therefore β1 indirectly incentivizes
agent 2 to work harder than the benchmark case.
This result also relates to the ratchet effect literature.14 When there is uncer-
tainty concerning how difficult it is for workers to perform the task, workers
tend to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future. The
underproduction of workers is due to workers’ prediction of future contracts,
while in my model the underproduction of high productivity worker is due to
the low powered incentive.15
Figure 1-3 depicts how α2 affects the optimal effort levels. I fix b1, b2, and β1
and b1 and vary α2. The upper and lower solid straight lines represent the opti-
14See Weitzman (1980), Holmstrom (1982) and Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985).
15Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) also assume that workers have more information about
their abilities than the firm.
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mal effort levels in the benchmark model. When α2 < α2 16 such that b1 > b2 (i.e.,
the efficiency motive is strong), the optimal efforts are different for two agents.
The thick dashed lines represent the optimal unequal effort levels, which can be
implemented by an unequal wage contract. When α2 > α2 such that b1 < b2 (i.e.,
the equality motive is strong), the optimal effort levels are the same for the two
agents. To sum up, as α2 increases, the optimal effort level of a high productiv-
ity worker decreases while the optimal effort level of a low productivity worker
increases until they are equal.
The principal’s profit decreases in agents’ inequity aversion parameters:
∂Πu
∂α2
< 0 and ∂Π
u
∂β1
< 0. Intuitively, the principal is worse off with equity-averse
agents than with standard agents, because the principal needs to compensate
agents for their disutility towards the wage difference.
Figure 1-4 shows how α2 affects profit levels for different levels of β1. The
three curves represent three cases β1 = 0, β1 = 0.1 and β1 = 0.2 respectively. As
can be seen for the three curves, the profit first falls then remains the same. For
example, if β1 = 0,the profit decreases with α2 when α2 < α2 = 0.1 (b1 > b2),
where the optimal wage contract is an unequal wage contract. The profit then
stays constant when α2 < α2 (b1 > b2). In addition, for the same value of α2, the
profit decreases with β1.
1.2.4 Optimal contract with status-seeking agents
In this section, I discuss the case when a principal faces status-seeking agents. In
the context of the model, status-seeking agents are the same as inequity-averse
16α2 =
b1(1−2β)
2b2
− 12
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agents when they are paid less than their co-workers; i.e., the envy concern is
the same. Differently, when status-seeking agents are paid more than others,
instead of the compassion, they derive pleasure from being paid more than oth-
ers, where βi < 0. βi measures the degree of status seeking. The lower the value
of βi, the stronger the status seeking is. It is straightforward to show that the
previous optimal contracts still apply if β1 ≥ −α2. The principal is better off with
status-seeking agents, i.e., ∂Π
u
∂β1
< 0, because she can pay a lower wage to a status-
seeking agent to induce the same level of effort when the status-seeking agent
is paid more than his co-worker.
Some interesting results arise and differ from the model with inequity-averse
agents if β1 < −α2. Intuitively, with status-seeking agents, the principal needs to
balance the trade-off among three concerns. Two concerns are the efficiency
motive and the envy from a low productivity worker, which are the same as
discussed in the previous subsection. The third concern is the status seeking
from a high productivity worker.
If the status seeking is greater than the envy: β1 < −α2, then b1 > b2 > b2.
According to Proposition 1-2, the optimal effort levels are always different. The
principal will use an unequal wage contract to induce a high productivity agent
to work more and a low productivity agent to work less than the benchmark
case. Both the optimal effort levels and the expected wages are more dispersed.
eu1 =
1 + α2 − β1
1 + 2α2
b1 > eB1 ; e
u
2 =
1 + α2 − β1
1 − 2β1 b2 < e
B
2
Comparing with the profit with the benchmark case, I find that the principal
earns more profit with status-seeking agents (Πu > ΠB) when the status seeking
is strong (β1 < −α2).
Formally, I have the following proposition,
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Proposition 1-4 With status-seeking agents,
1. If β1 > −α2, the optimal effort levels and the optimal contract are the same
as described in Proposition 1-2. The optimal effort levels and wage levels are
more compressed than in the benchmark case.
2. If β1 < −α2, the principal implements the unequal wage contract and earns
more profit than in the benchmark case. The optimal effort levels and wage
levels are more diverse than in the benchmark case.
A linear wage contract wi(xi) = aixi + ti can implement the optimal effort
levels, where au1 =
1+α2−β1
(1+2α2)(1−β1) and a
u
2 =
1+α2−β1
(1−2β1)(1+a2) , where a
u
1 < 1 < a
u
2.
Discussing the optimal wage contract with status-seeking agents, 17 Frank
(1984b) models social preferences by incorporating workers’ ranking in firm’s
income hierarchy. He finds the result that the marginal powers of incentive are
flatter for both high productivity and low productivity workers than with stan-
dard workers. Different from his model, I assume different incentive contract
for both agents. In contrast, my model implies that it is optimal for the principal
to adopt a high powered marginal incentive for a low productivity worker and
a low powered marginal incentive for a high productivity worker.
1.2.5 Wage secrecy policy VS wage transparency policy
Why do many firms adopt a wage secrecy policy instead of a wage transparency
policy?18
17Frank (1984b) does not assume that agents are envious of their co-workers if their pay is less
than the pay of their co-workers.
18Card, Mas, Moretti, and Saez (2010) upset many people working in public organizations and
universities, when they sent the link containing their compensations as well as their colleagues’.
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Several previous studies have offered explanations for wage secrecy.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) propose that managers can lead a ”quiet”
life without any complaints about wage inequality if they keep wages secret.
Danziger and Katz (1997) suggest that wage secrecy enhances the feasibility of
risk-shifting contracts by reducing effective labor mobility. Beyond these rea-
sons, the above model implies that a wage secrecy policy is also more profitable
for the firm with inequity-averse agents. Because if workers cannot compare
and estimate their co-workers’ wages, they do not incur negative utility from
inequity aversion. Proposition 1-3 predicts that with a wage secrecy policy, the
principal does not need to consider inequity aversion between agents, therefore,
the wages are more diverse and correspond with wages in the benchmark case.
In contrast, with status-seeking agents the principal may want to adopt a
wage transparency policy. If the status seeking concern is large enough, the
pleasure from a high productivity worker outweighs the disutility from a low
productivity worker. It is more profitable for firms to exploit the status seeking
concern by making the wage structure transparent.
It may seem contradictory that wage compression exists in many firms with
wage secrecy policies. There are huge differences extended to how well a wage
secrecy policy is executed in some sense. Even a firm carry a strict wage secrecy
policy, workers may discuss their wages with their co-workers.
Other factors may also affect whether a firm adopting a wage secrecy policy
or a wage transparency policy. For example, even with a wage secrecy policy,
workers may still form some perception of their co-workers’ wages. If the per-
ceived wage differential is greater than the real wage differential, a wage trans-
Clark and Oswald (1996) report that people’s satisfaction level is inversely related with their
comparison wage rates.
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parency policy with wage compression may be preferred to a wage secrecy pol-
icy. If perceived wage differential is similar to real wage differential, then the
model predicts that whether the firm adopts a wage secrecy policy or a wage
transparency policy does not matter. Workers’ different perception of their co-
workers’ wages in different firms can also help explain that wage compression
exists in some firms while wage secrecy exists in other firms.
1.3 Extension 1: varying the number of workers
For the previous sections, I assumed that the number of workers is exogenous;
i.e., the principal has to employ two workers to complete the project. For this
discussion I relax this assumption and endogenize the number of workers that
the principal can hire. I also consider how the principal organizes teams effi-
ciently when she faces multiple agents with heterogeneous productivities.
1.3.1 Hiring only one high productivity agent
If the project can be completed by one worker, when a principal only hires a
high ability worker, the principal’s profit is Π1 = b
2
1
2 . (Superscript 1 denotes the
case where only agent 1 is employed.)
I compare the profits with two inequity-averse agents and find that if one
worker is considerably more productive than another worker, the firm would
rather only employ a high productivity agent. Intuitively, hiring a low produc-
tivity worker demotivates a high productivity worker, because of the negative
utility from wage differences.
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Formally, I have following Proposition 1-5:
Proposition 1-5 There exists b1 such that for any b1 > b1, the principal would rather
hire a high productivity worker instead of both workers, holding all other param-
eters fixed.
Proposition 1-5 implies that even when workers have net positive marginal
products, with other-regarding preferences among workers, the principal
would not hire all agents. This result seems to contradict the standard results
without assuming spillovers in production. The classic theory does not generate
this result without assuming existence of sabotage between workers. (Lazear,
1989)
1.3.2 Sorting
Next consider four workers: two high productivity workers and two low pro-
ductivity workers that must be organized into two teams of two workers, be-
cause there are two identical projects and each project requires two workers
to complete. Suppose the principal knows the workers’ inequity aversion pa-
rameters and productivities before hiring them. How should the principal pair
agents? Should the principal pair a high productivity agent with a high pro-
ductivity agent or combine a high productivity agent with a low productivity
agent? From Proposition 1-4, I derive the following corollary:
Corollary 1-2 1. If agents are inequity averse, the principal will pair a high
productivity worker with a high productivity worker and a low pro-
ductivity worker with a low productivity worker.
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2. If agents are highly status seeking, the principal will combine a high
productivity worker with a low productivity worker.
The first result is similar to Siemens (2007). The firm can avoid the social
comparisons between inequity-averse workers by designing the optimal con-
tract so that workers sort into the workforce with homogeneous productivities.
This second result in Corollary 4 corresponds to the result in Frank(1984b). The
firm can gain profit by sorting status-seeking workers who are willing to give up
monetary compensation for status with workers with lower pay who care less
about status. One difference is that Frank (1984b) obtains compressed wage dis-
tributions for status-seeking workers because the workers are free choose their
coworkers in his model. However, in my model, if the status seeking is very
strong, wage dispersion arises. Greater wage dispersion increases the power of
incentives for the high productivity worker, hence, the firm can exploit more
profit.
1.4 Extension 2: synergies between the agents
One of the main reasons for team production is because of positive spillovers
among workers’ production. In this section, I extend the basic model and as-
sume that there are synergies between workers. I want to analyze the interaction
between synergies and inequity aversion. One interesting question is whether
synergies exacerbate or mitigate inequity aversion among workers.
There are two main ways to model synergies. One kind of synergy takes
the form of a marginal effect, i.e., one worker’s effort can increase other work-
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ers’ marginal productivity. Second, one worker’s effort has a direct impact on
the other worker’s output level without changing the other worker’s marginal
product.19
First, suppose synergies take the first form, i.e., an increase in worker i′s ef-
fort can increase marginal productivity of worker j. Assume that the output
function for agent i is xi = (bi + se j)ei + i, i = 1, 2, in which (bi + se j) represents
agent i’s effective marginal productivity.20 With inequity-averse agents, the logic
of analysis is similar to Proposition 1-2 and Corollary 1-3 in the appendix de-
rives the optimal contract. Notice that under the optimal contract, the differ-
ence between effective marginal productivities of agents is b1 + se2 − (b2 + se1) =
b1 − b2 − s(e1 − e2) ≤ b1 − b2, because e1 ≥ e2. Intuitively, the marginal effect
of synergy reduces the differential between effective marginal productivities;
therefore, it mitigates the inequity aversion among workers, which provides
another reason for teamwork.
Next, suppose synergies have a level effect without increasing marginal pro-
ductivity. Assume that the output function for each agent is xi = biei + S e j + i,
where S measures the synergy effect and it is a level effect on another worker’s
production. Without inequity aversion, optimal effort levels are eB1 = b1 + S ,
eB2 = b2 + S . Corollary 1-4 in the appendix derives the optimal contract. In this
case, synergy does not mitigate inequity aversion among workers.
If the principal can choose to hire one or two inequity-averse workers, there
is a trade-off between the synergy effect and inequity aversion. In the above
19A third way to model synergy is that one worker’s effort reduces another worker’s marginal
productivity but increases the level of production. But we are only interested in the first two
ways.
20With standard agents, optimal effort levels are e1 = b1+2sb21−4s2 , e2 =
b2+2sb1
1−4s2 . To guarantee finite
solutions, I assume s < 0.5.
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model without synergies, the principal could increase her profit by adopting
wage secrecy policies or by hiring two independent contractors who cannot
meet each other and cannot compare their wages. But this is not necessarily the
case if there is a positive spillover effect between agents’ efforts (for example,
their efforts are complements). The basic idea is that when the synergy effect is
strong, the principal will let two inequity-averse agents work together. When
inequity aversion is strong, the principal will contract with two independent
contractors or adopt a wage secrecy policy.
1.5 Related literature
Chapter 1 is related to two strands of literature.
First, it contributes to behavioral contract theory with other-regarding pref-
erence. Englmaier and Wambach (2010) analyze the classical moral hazard prob-
lem with a selfish principal and an agent comparing his income with the princi-
pal’s. They also extend the model to 2 agents’ case in which the agent compares
his income with the other agent’s income as well as principal’s. They conclude
relative performance evaluation is optimal even if the tasks are technologically
independent. Bartling and Siemens (2004) analyze the interaction of behindness
aversion and risk aversion in the moral hazard model with two agents. The in-
equity aversion increases agency costs and inequity aversion renders flat wage
contracts optimal. They also shed light on the boundary of the firm. Dur and
Glazer (2008) study optimal contracts when a worker envies his boss. Their
analysis sheds light on the different incentives between private and public in-
dustries. In a private firm, a principal needs to compensate agents more for
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inequity aversion while incentive pay is lower in public or nonprofit organiza-
tion. Thakor and Goel (2005) studies optimal contracts when agents envy each
other. The key result is that team incentives are optimal even though other’s per-
formance provides no information about one’s action. Grund and Sliwka(2005)
discuss envy and compassion in tournaments. Bartling and Siemens(2004) stud-
ies efficiency in team production with inequity averse agents. Rey-Biel (2008)
argues that envy and guilt can be profitably exploited by the employer. Their
results imply that sometimes inequity aversion is a reason to form work teams.
Demougin, Fluet and Helm (2006) discuss an interesting asymmetric informa-
tion case where agent 2 in task 2’s effort is verifiable while agent 1 in task 1’s
effort is not. More inequity aversion reduces equilibrium output and effort of
agent 1. The effort of agent 2 decreases (increases) if there efforts are comple-
ments (substitutes). In terms of key topics discussed, Chapter 1 is most closely
to Charness and Kuhn (2004). But I use a different model from theirs and I
assume that workers can have different payment structure (different marginal
incentive powers and transfers) while they assume the same contract for both
workers.
Second, my work relates to the theory of other-regarding preferences, psy-
chological game and lab experiments. The theory of other regarding preferences
including Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Rabin (1993),
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2002), Falk and Fischbacher (2000), Charness and
Rabin (2002), Cox and Friedman (2002), Levine (1998), and Lazear (1992). 21
21See Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for a comprehensive survey concerning other-regarding pref-
erences.
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1.6 Conclusion
I build a parsimonious model incorporating inequity aversion and heteroge-
neous labor productivities. The main result in Chapter 1 is that inequity aver-
sion causes wage compression. This result depends on the assumption that the
agents are inequity averse to ex-ante wage difference. This model can apply
to the cases with an information structure in which effort and ex-post wages
between the workers are not perfectly observable while ex-ante wages are ob-
servable. The results are robust if the workers are inequity averse to effort dif-
ferences or inequity averse to both effort differences and wage differences. In
other words, the model can easily extend to the case where wages are secret but
efforts are observable.22 In this case, as shown by Lemma 1-5 in the appendix,
inequity aversion to effort differences can also cause wage compression. But if
agents compare their ex ante rents, the inequity aversion doesn’t matter. Be-
cause of symmetric information, the principal can always extract all the rent,
so the rent is zero for the agents. This model sheds light on wage secrecy and
wage transparency policies. Generally, with inequity-averse agents, the firm
earns more profit by adopting a wage secrecy policy.
This model can also predict different incentive schemes within an internal
labor market. Due to wage compression, a high-powered incentive contract
should apply to a low productivity worker, while a low-powered incentive
scheme should apply a high productivity worker. This finding has some empir-
ical implications about power of incentives for workers with different produc-
tivities. For example, in a sales department, a senior salesman with more expe-
rience is usually a high productivity worker compared with an inexperienced
22It may apply the case when workers are closely working together and firms adopt wage
secrecy policies.
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junior salesman. This model can predict that, if workers are inequity averse, the
firm should apply a low-powered incentive contract to a senior salesman and
apply a high-powered incentive contract to a junior salesman.
As to the future research path, there are several directions I can pursue. The
model assumes the complete information structure. One future study is to re-
lax this assumption and to explore the optimal contract under the incomplete
information of productivities. Second, I analyze the problem under the mo-
nopolistic setting, which can be extended to a competitive setting, especially
to study the sorting between the firms and competitive screening of heteroge-
neous workers. Third, I assume that each worker’s payment only depends on
his performance. In reality settings, workers’ wage may include a team pay-
ment component, which is a function of total output. In other words, worker’s
wage does not only depend on his/her own performance but also depends on
the performance of the whole team. Employing such a team payment compo-
nent may reduce the difference in compensation across workers and might be
preferred in the context of this chapter since compensation differences reduce
worker’s utility. Empirically, I hope to test the results in this chapter. I can
collect compensation data in different firms across industries to see if inequity
aversion has an impact on the compensation structure and firms’ performance.
For example, I can compare the performances and the compensation structures
of a firm before it adopting a wage secrecy policy and after it adopting wage
secrecy (controlling for workers’ perception of their co-workers’ wages). If the
firm’s wage compensation becomes compressed after adopting a wage secrecy
policy, then the evidence supports the results of the chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
ENRICHING MULTI-ROUND TOURNAMENT THEORY
2.1 Introduction
In the organizational literature, the convex wage structure describes the convex
relationship between hierarchical levels and promotion prizes. In other words,
the promotion prize increases with the hierarchical level. Many empirical stud-
ies demonstrate this convex wage structure. For example, Lambert, Larcker, and
Weigelt (1993) obtain compensation data for four distinct organizational lev-
els ranging from the plant manager to the corporate CEO in 303 large publicly
traded U.S. firms. Their findings support convex wage structures. In particu-
lar they find a considerably large increase in the final stage, i.e., the difference
in compensation level for the CEO relative to the next lower position in the or-
ganizational hierarchy is “extraordinarily” large relative to the compensation
increases observed at the lower levels of hierarchy. Baker, Gibbs, and Holm-
strom (1994a, 1994b) analyze twenty years of personnel data of a single firm
and also find this convex relationship. Eriksson (1999) analyzes actual compen-
sation data of 2600 executives over 260 Danish firms during a four-year period.
He finds that as one moves up the corporate hierarchy, the pay difference in-
creases, even when controlling for individual and firm characteristics.1
Some theoretical literature provides explanations for the convex wage struc-
tures documented above, however, in a limited way. One important explanation
is proposed by Rosen (1986). He models the promotion in hierarchical firms us-
ing a multi-round tournament setting. Specifically, he assumes that a single firm
1Also see Lazear (1992), O’Reilly, Main, and Crystal (1988), and Main et al. (1993)
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hires a number of identical workers who compete in pairs. Each worker’s pro-
duction depends on the effort input and a noise variable. The worker with the
higher output is the winner and enters the next round. This process repeats
until a final winner is generated. In order to induce optimal effort levels from
workers, the firm commits to an ex ante wage structure. A prize is earned when
a worker wins a round. The more rounds a worker wins, the more money the
worker earns. The money earned in a round can be considered as a wage in-
crease. We also call it the direct monetary prize, the inter-rank spread, or the
direct promotion prize with the hierarchical level.
Rosen (1986) shows that the promotion prizes of the optimal wage structure
are the same across all previous hierarchical levels with a substantial increase in
the final level. Intuitively, except for the last round, the incentive for workers to
win a round is not only just the direct monetary prize from winning that round.
The incentive also consists of the option value or the expected prize from the
possibility of winning subsequent rounds. Because there is no option value for
the last round, the direct monetary prize for the last round is greater than the
direct monetary prize from winning previous rounds. Rosen (1986) partly ex-
plains the convex wage structure in the sense that the promotion prize increases
sharply for the last round. Nevertheless this result is not fully consistent with
the above empirical findings, because the promotion prize not only increases in
the last round, but also increases in the previous rounds too.
The inconsistency is due to the simplified assumption of homogeneous stage
effects across rounds, i.e., the assumption that both the number of people com-
peting and the optimal effort level are the same across rounds. Rosen (1986)
briefly mentions that some extensions, which allow for varying nature across
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stages, may amend this consistency. For example, Rosen (1986) proposes the
extensions that, ”in a corporate hierarchy the pass-through rate may fall at each
successive rank”, or ”higher-ranking positions are more demanding than lower-
ranking ones”, may fully explain the convex wage structure. Because of those
heterogeneous stage effects, Rosen (1986) explains that ”game proceeds, and
interrank spreads must be increasing to undo the incentive dilution effects of
greater discounting of the future, which otherwise reduces the option value of
continuation.” His intuition offers possible extensions, which may help explain
convex wage structures. However, no one has theoretically derived convex
wage structures rigorously under the setting of classical multi-round tourna-
ments.
In this chapter, we theoretically demonstrate that a convex wage structure
is optimal by assuming heterogeneous stage effects in the classical multi-round
tournament model. Specifically, we make two extensions to Rosen (1986)’s tour-
nament model. The first extension is that the number of workers rises with the
hierarchical level or the probability of winning decreases with the hierarchical
level. This extension is realistic because it is usually more difficult for work-
ers to be promoted as they move up the career ladder (See Baker, Gibbs, and
Holmstrom, 1994a). The second extension is that the return to effort increases
in rounds, or the optimal effort increases in rounds. This extension is realistic
too because the position in higher levels plays a more significant role than the
position in lower levels and thus higher levels require more effort input.
For the first extension, more people competing in further rounds suggests
that the promotion rate decreases with hierarchical levels. Baker, Gibbs, and
Holmstrom (1994a) used twenty years of personnel data from one firm to show
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that promotion rates fall dramatically with the (higher) hierarchical level (from
56% to 11%). Intuitively, if the probability for winning decreases, then the op-
tion prize decreases across rounds. To induce the same effort level in all rounds,
the optimal direct promotion prize increases monotonically with the hierarchi-
cal level. Thus, the optimal wage structure is convex. This extension supports
Rosen (1986)’s conjecture. In this extension the key factor is the decreasing pro-
motion rate, but the promotion rate is endogenous in the model. To stay close
to Rosen (1986)’s model, we make the primitive assumption about the number
of workers competing.
We also discuss the second extension that the returns to effort increase in
rounds. The assumption that the returns to effort increase in rounds is valid
for many firms because the higher the job level, the higher the returns to effort.
Therefore the optimal effort level is increasing across rounds. Intuitively, the
promotion prize (the sum of the option value and the inter-rank prize) will in-
crease to compensate the increasing effort cost. However the option value will
not necessarily increase or decrease and we cannot reach the conclusion that the
inter-rank prize will increase monotonically. In other words, the result of this
extension diverges from Rosen’s (1986) conjecture that the increasing efficient
effort level would yield a more smoothly convex wage structure. We construct
an example where the effort level increases moderately and the promotion rates
are low, and where the inter-rank prize first falls then rises and the optimal wage
structure is not convex.
Therefore, to generate convex wage structures in the second extension, we
need further assumptions about the cost functions or the probability of winning
functions. One sufficient condition to generate convex wage structures is a de-
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creasing option value across rounds. The option prize from winning round n is
the difference between the expected earnings from winning subsequent rounds
and the cost of effort in round n + 1. The expected earnings can be considered
as the promotion prize in round n + 1 discounted by the promotion rate. If the
promotion rate is low or the cost of effort increases sharply across rounds, then
the option prize will decrease. We discuss a special case when the cost function
is quadratic and the firm’s output function is linear in effort. If the production
uncertainty is small enough, then the optimal wage structure is convex. Rosen
(1982)’s paper is related to this extension, but he assumes workers have het-
erogeneous talents and discusses the matching of talents with the hierarchical
positions of the firm. He finds that it is optimal to assign persons with superior
abilities to top positions because of the multiplicative effects that greater talent
at top positions will also influence the lower levels, hence increasing productiv-
ity by more than the increments of their abilities. He concludes that it is optimal
to offer the superior top level manager enormous rewards.
Chapter 2 is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review.
Section 3 presents the benchmark model setup, in which we generalize Rosen
(1986)’s model by assuming more than two workers competing in each round.
Based on the benchmark model, in section 4 we investigate the two realistic
extensions discussed above. The first extension is that the number of workers
competing increases across rounds. And the second extension is that the returns
to effort increase in rounds. Section 5 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
This chapter contributes to the literature of convex wage structures and enriches
the theories of promotion tournaments.
As mentioned in the introduction, many papers have empirically studied
the wage structures in hierarchical firms. For example, Lambert, Larcker, and
Weigelt (1993), Main, O’Reilly and Wade (1993), Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom
(1994a, 1994b), and Eriksson (1999), have documented convex wage structures
empirically, especially the case where sharp rewards are needed to motivate the
highest hierarchical level.
There are two main approaches to model promotions in internal labor mar-
kets. One is the classical promotion tournament initially formulated in the sem-
inal analysis by Lazear and Rosen (1981). They assume that firms commit ex
ante to future levels of compensation associated with promotions. This ex ante
prize structure induces the optimal effort levels of workers. As a consequence,
there is a close relationship between efficient effort choices and mechanisms of
the task. The second approach is a market-based tournament built on Waldman
(1984a)2, who also analyzes the case where promotion prizes serve as incentives
for workers’ efforts. In contrast with the classical tournament model, firms can-
not commit to the future wage rates when workers are young. Instead, a pro-
motion serves as a positive signal concerning worker ability. After observing
this signal, other potential employers will offer higher wages to the promoted
workers, thereby determining the prize of promotion if the current firms want
to keep the promoted workers and to reduce the turnovers. Therefore no direct
2See Gibbs (1995), Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001), Zabojnik (2008), and Ghosh and Waldman
(2010).
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relationship exists between the promotion prize and the efficient effort levels.
Both classical tournament models and market-based tournament models can
help explain many aspects of empirical evidence in internal labor markets, such
as promotions associated with large wage increases. But the classical tourna-
ment literature can provide more intuitive explanations for the convex wage
structure.
Following the assumption that firms commit to an ex ante wage structure,
many papers provide theoretical explanations for convex wage structures from
different views. For example, as we mentioned above, Rosen (1986) extends
Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) model to a multi-round tournament model to explain
that wages increase constantly across hierarchical levels until the final level
when wages increase sharply. This chapter generalizes and extends his multi-
round tournament model to fully explain the convex wage structure. Rosen
(1982) also provides some explanation for why a convex wage structure exists
at the top level. Specifically, Rosen (1982) models the assignment of talents to
hierarchical positions in a three-level firm and explains the enormous rewards
at the top level in some large firms. Calvo and Wellisz (1979) also point out the
important role of talent in monitoring and organizing hierarchical production.
Different from our model, Rosen (1982) and Calvo and Wellisz (1979) assume
that workers are heterogeneous in their talents. They propose that more talented
workers will be sorted into higher levels and that these workers also increase the
productivity of lower level workers. At top levels the marginal productivities
of workers are higher, therefore, the optimal wage increases quickly as workers
move up the hierarchy.
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2.3 The Benchmark Model
Following Rosen (1986), we analyze the optimal wage structure in a multi-round
tournament setting. In the benchmark model, we assume homogeneous stage
effect and we generalize Rosen’s (1986) model slightly to replicate his key re-
sults. Specifically, we assume n workers compete instead of 2 workers as in
Rosen’s model. And we derive that the optimal wage increases constantly for
all levels except a sharp increase for the final level.
Suppose a firm has N hierarchical levels (or N rounds). Suppose nN homoge-
neous workers enter the firm and compete to enter higher levels. In each level
workers compete in a group of n people. In other words, the number of workers
competing is the same across rounds. Round 1 consists of nN/n = nN−1 matches.
For each match the worker with the higher output level is the winner, with the
winners in other matches entering the competition of the next round. Therefore,
nN−1 workers enter round 2. After N rounds, only one winner remains.
Assume that a worker’s output depends on his effort level (e) and a noise
variable (), which follows a known distribution with expected value 0 and vari-
ance σ2.3 Let wk be the reward if a worker only wins k rounds. For example, the
overall winner wins wN .
Let ek denote the effort exerted in round k and let c(ek) be the cost associated
with the effort level ek. We assume that the cost function is increasing (c′(ek) > 0)
and is convex (c′′(ek) > 0). Because we assume that workers have equal talents
or abilities, the probability of a worker winning in round k, pk, depends on his
effort ek given his opponents’ effort levels e−k : p(ek|e−k). Because workers are
3As discussed briefly in Lazear and Rosen (1986), when agents are risk neutral, the noise
does not have an effect on the optimal solutions.
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homogenous, the equilibrium is symmetric and the induced effort is the same
for all workers in round k: ek = e−k 4. We assume the optimal effort in round k
denoted by e∗k is exogenous. The optimal wage structure should implement the
optimal effort levels, i.e., ek = e−k = e∗k.
The same effort levels in round k indicate that the probability of winning in
round k, denoted by p(e∗k) (= p(e
∗
k|e∗k)), is also the same for all workers. Because
the workers compete in a group of n people in each round, the probability of
winning for a worker is 1n .
We assume the same stage effect in the benchmark model. In other words,
we assume that the number of workers competing is the same across rounds
and the optimal effort level is also the same across rounds. Let e∗ be the optimal
effort level in each round and let c∗ be the cost associated with e∗. Therefore,
the optimal wage structure induces every worker to exert effort level e∗ across
rounds, i.e., e∗k = e
∗. To induce the optimal effort level e∗ in each round, the firm
chooses the optimal wage structure {w1,w2, ...,wN}.5
Rosen (1986) derives one key result of this optimal wage structure when the
match is a pairwise competition. He also assumes homogeneous stage effects
across rounds. Rosen concludes that the incremental prize for winning the last
round (wN−wN−1) is much higher than the inter-rank prize or the direct monetary
prize in the previous rounds (wk−wk−1, k = 2, ...,N−1), while the direct monetary
prizes (wk − wk−1, k = 2, ...,N − 1) are the same in the previous rounds.
Intuitively, as there are no further rounds beyond the last round, the prize for
4Note that e−k is a vector of effort levels of all the other players other than player k. But the
symmetric equilibrium indicates the effort levels are the same for all the players. For the sake
of simplicity, we denote e−k as a scaler.
5It is obvious that the optimal wage structure satisfies that w1 < w2 < ... < wN−1 < wN . If not,
for example, if wk > wk+1 then workers who won stage k will not exert any effort in round k + 1.
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winning the last round is only a direct monetary prize, which should be greater
than the direct monetary prizes from winning previous rounds, since there is no
option value for the last round.
To illuminate the logic of the above results, we present two approaches. The
first approach closely follows Waldman (2011)’s concise analysis, which cap-
tures the key intuition in a multi-round tournament model. The second ap-
proach is the Bellman equation method used in Rosen (1986)’s paper. The first
approach can be used to demonstrate that the optimal wage structure in the first
extension is convex, but the first approach cannot characterize the optimal wage
structure in the second extension. Therefore, we have to use second approach,
the Bellman equation.
2.3.1 First approach
Under the setting of our model, proposition 2-1 characterizes the optimal wage
structure.
Proposition 2-1 The inter-rank prize is the same for the previous N − 1 rounds
wk+1 − wk = (1 − 1n )(wN − wN−1) + c
∗, where k = 1, 2, ...,N − 2.
The inter-rank prize for the last round is greater than the inter-rank prize for the
previous rounds
w2 − w1 = w3 − w2 = w4 − w3 = ... = wN−1 − wN−2 < wN − wN−1.
The proof is relegated to the appendix.
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Intuitively, to induce the same effort level in each round, the promotion prize
for winning each round should be the same. Winning round k, except for the last
round N, involves two prizes. One is the direct promotion reward (incremental
monetary prize or inter-rank prize) from winning round k, i.e.,wk − wk−1. The
other prize is the option prize, i.e., the expected value from the possibility of
winning subsequent rounds. According to the above reasoning, the prize from
winning round N − 1 is the direct monetary prize, wN−1 −wN−2, and the expected
value of winning round N,which is the difference between the expected earning
from round N and the cost of effort, 1n (wN − wN−1) − c∗. The expected earning in
round N−1, 1n (wN−wN−1), can be considered as the earning in round N, (wN−wN−1),
discounted by the promotion rate 1n . The sum of these two prizes equals the
promotion prize from winning round N,
wN−1 − wN−2 + 1n (wN − wN−1) − c
∗ = wN − wN−1.
Analogously, the prize from winning round N − 2 is composed of the inter-rank
prize (wN−2−wN−3) and the expected value of winning subsequent rounds, which
is the difference between expected earning from winning round N − 1 and the
cost of effort, ( 1n [wN−1 −wN−2 + 1n (wN −wN−1)− c∗]− c∗). The expected earning from
winning round N − 1, 1n [wN−1 −wN−2 + 1n (wN −wN−1)− c∗] can also be considered as
the promotion prize for winning n discounted by the probability of winning (1n ),
because it is same as the expected earning from winning round N, 1n (wN − wN−1).
Therefore, the inter-rank prize is the same for round N and round N − 1.
Repeating this procedure yields the following equation
w2 − w1 = ... = wN−2 − wN−3 = (1 − 1n )(wN − wN−1) + c
∗. (2.1)
The above equation shows that the direct monetary prize is the same for all
the rounds except the last round. If we compare the direct monetary prize of the
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last round with the direct monetary prize of the previous rounds, we obtain
(wN − wN−1) − (wk − wk−1) = 1n (wN − wN−1) − c
∗, where k = 1, 2, ...,N − 1. (2.2)
The optimal wage structure implies that 1n (wN − wN−1) − c∗ ≥ 0. Otherwise,
no one exerts effort at the last stage because exerting efforts at stage N incurs
negative net expected payoff for the workers.
Therefore, it follows from (2.1) and (2.2) that the direct prize from winning
increases constantly with a greater increase in the final round. This result is
consistent with the result in Rosen (1986)’s paper. The promotion prize ((1 −
1
n )(wN − wN−1) + c∗) and the option prize ( 1n (wN − wN−1) − c∗) stay the same for all
rounds except the last round (no option prize). Therefore, the inter-rank prize,
which is the difference between the promotion prize and the option prize, is the
same for all rounds except the last round.6
2.3.2 Second approach
We can also use Bellman equation approach, as used in Rosen (1986), to analyze
the optimal wage structure under the setting of the benchmark model. Define
Vk as the value to a worker when n− k possible rounds remain to be played. For
an overall winner, VN = wN . If a worker enters the round k, the Bellman equation
is
Vk−1 = max
ek
{(1 − p(ek|e−k))Vk + p(ek|e−k)wk − c(ek)}.
The first order condition yields Vk − wk = c′(e∗)p′(e∗) , because the optimal wage struc-
ture implements optimal effort level ek = e∗.
6The key assumptions driving this result is that the optimal effort level (e∗) and the promo-
tion rate ( 1n ) are the same across rounds.
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To derive the optimal wage structure, we first derive the following Lemma
2-1.
Lemma 2-1 Let β = 1n− p
′(e∗)
c′(e∗) c
∗. VN = wN; Vk = βVk+1+(1−β)wk,where k = 1, ...,N−1.
The formal proof is relegated to the appendix.
It follows from Lemma 2-1 that VN−1 = βwN+(1−β)wN−1,where β = 1n− p
′(e∗)
c′(e∗) c
∗ >
0. Because if β < 0, then VN−1 < wN−1.7 In other words, a worker has no incentive
to exert any effort in the last round, which contradicts the goal of the firm: to
induce positive effort in each round. By Lemma 2-1, we can characterize the
optimal wage structure in the following Proposition 2-2.
Proposition 2-2 The inter-rank prize is the same for the previous N − 1 rounds, i.e.,
wk − wk−1 = (1 − 1n )
c′(e∗)
p′(e∗)
+ c∗, k = 1, 2, ...,N − 1
The inter-rank prize for the last round is wN − wN−1 = c′(e∗)p′(e∗) .
(wN − wN−1) − (wk − wk−1) = 1n
c′(e∗)
p′(e∗)
− c∗ > 0 since β = 1
n
− p
′(e∗)
c′(e∗)
c∗ > 0.
Therefore the inter-rank prizes are the same for previous N − 1 rounds with an
increase in round N.
w2 − w1 = w3 − w2 = w4 − w3 = ... = wN−1 − wN−2 < wN − wN−1.
The proof is relegated to the appendix.
The increase of inter-rank prizes for the last round is (wN − wN−1) − (wN−1 −
wN−2) = 1n
c′(e∗)
p′(e∗) − c∗ > 0 , which is the option value from winning round N − 1.
The option value, 1n
c′(e∗)
p′(e∗) − c∗, is the same for all rounds except the last round (no
option value).
7Here β > 0 accords with the inequality 1n (wN − wN−1) − c∗ > 0 in the first approach.
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2.4 Enriching the model to explain a convex wage structure
The above two approaches prove Rosen (1986)’s main result in a more general
setting. However, as we discussed in the introduction, this optimal wage struc-
ture does not capture the real world phenomenon that the inter-rank promotion
prize not only increases in the last round, but also increases in previous rounds.
Therefore, an interesting question to explore is, under what circumstances is the
optimal wage structure convex? In the setting of our model, a convex wage
structure is expressed as w2 − w1 < ... < wN−1 − wN−2 < wN − wN−1. We explore
two different realistic extensions which may generate a convex wage structure.
The first extension is that the number of people competing increases with the
hierarchical level. The second extension is that returns to extra ability or effort
increase with the hierarchical level.
2.4.1 Extension 1: the number of people competing increases
with the hierarchical level
As discussed in the introduction, if the promotion rate decreases with the hier-
archical level, to induce the same effort level across rounds, then the interrank
prize will be designed to increase so that the promotion prize will be the same
across the rounds. The decreasing promotion rate is the key assumption to gen-
erate the convex wage structure. However, this assumption is not about the
primitiveness of the model. In this extension, we discuss possible cases may
result in decreasing promotion rates.
The promotion rate for a worker is the ratio of the number of positions to
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the number of workers competing for the positions, because workers are ho-
mogenous in the model. In workplaces it is harder and harder for workers to
go up the hierarchy for two main reasons. One is that the number of positions
available to workers decreases faster than the number of workers competing for
them. For example, in some firms many workers may compete for only one
CEO position while there may be many available lower level positions. The sec-
ond reason is that the number of workers competing increases across the round.
For example, in some firms the higher the job levels the larger the pool of can-
didates.
To stay close to Rosen (1986)’s model, in this extension we make the prim-
itive assumption that the number of workers increases with the hierarchical
level;8 however, as shown in the proof below, that the key factor generating
the convex wage structure is the decreasing promotion rate.
We assume that the total number of workers is n1n2....nN−1, where nk workers
compete in each match of round k. We assume that the number of people com-
peting in each match increases with the hierarchical level: n1 < n2 < ... < nN−1 <
nN .After round k, nk+1nk+2nN−1nN workers enter round k+1. After N rounds, there
is one overall winner.
Because workers are homogenous, the probability of winning round k, de-
noted by pk, is the same for all participants in that round, i.e., pk = 1nk . More
participants competing in matches in further rounds reduce the probability of
winning, i.e., p1 > p2 > p3 > ... > pN .
As shown above in the benchmark model, because the optimal effort e∗ is
assumed to be the same across rounds, the optimal promotion prize for each
8This assumption is briefly discussed in Rosen (1986) and Waldman (2011).
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round is the same across rounds too. We denote c∗ to be the cost associated
with the optimal effort e∗. As discussed in the first approach, except for the last
round, the promotion prize in round k is composed of a direct monetary reward
(wk−wk−1) and the option prize or the expected prizes from winning subsequent
rounds.
Therefore, the promotion prize in round N−1, wN−1−wN−2+ pN(wN−wN−1)−c∗
equals the promotion prize in round N, wN − wN−1.
Following the same logic as in approach 1, we can derive the relationship
between the inter-rank prize in round k and the inter-rank prize in round N,
k = 2, ...,N − 1, which is presented in Lemma 2-2.
Lemma 2-2 wk − wk−1 = (1 − pk+1)(wN − wN−1) + c∗, k = 1, 2, 3, ...,N − 1,
Proof: To prove the above equation is equivalent to proving
wN − wN−1 = wk − wk−1 + pk+1(wN − wN−1) − c∗, k = 1, 2, 3, ...,N − 1. (2.3)
Because the optimal effort levels are the same across the rounds, promo-
tion prizes are the same across rounds too, i.e., the promotion prize in round N
equals the promotion prize in round k, k = 1, 2, ...,N − 1.
Specifically, the promotion prize in round N equals the promotion prize in
round N − 1, i.e.,
wN − wN−1 = wN−1 − wN−2 + pN(wN − wN−1) − c∗ (2.4)
or wN − wN−1 = 11 − pN (wN−1 − wN−2 − c
∗).
Hence, equation (2.3) holds for k = N − 1.
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For the same reason, the promotion prize in round N equals the promotion
prize in round N − 2,
wN − wN−1 = wN−2 − wN−3 + pN−1[wN−1 − wN−2 + pN(wN − wN−1) − c∗] − c∗.
Substituting equation (2.4) into the above equation yields
wN − wN−1 = wN−2 − wN−3 + pN−1(wN − wN−1) − c∗.
Thus equation (2.3) holds for k = N − 2 as well. Analogously, we can prove
that equation (2.3) holds by induction for k = 1, 2, ...,N − 1.
From Lemma 2, and from the assumption that the probability of winning is
decreasing across rounds, i.e., p1 > p2 > p3 > ... > pn, we can easily see that
the inter-rank prize is increasing with the hierarchical level, i.e., wN−1 − wN−2 >
wN−2−wN−3 > ... > w2−w1. This convex wage structure is generated directly from
the assumption that the probability of winning decreases with the hierarchical
level. Intuitively, the option prize for winning round k (except the last round N
), pk+1(wN −wN−1)−c∗, decreases as workers enter higher levels because it is more
difficult for them to win in higher levels. Therefore, the direct monetary prize
must increase with the hierarchical level so that the promotion prize is constant
and the same effort level can be induced across rounds.
Equation (2.3) indicates (wN − wN−1) − (wN−1 − wN−2) = pN(wN − wN−1) − c∗. As
discussed above, the optimal wage structure must satisfy pN(wN −wN−1)− c∗ > 0.
Otherwise, workers would not exert any effort in the last round. Summarizing
the above results, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2-3 If the number of workers competing increases with the hierarchical
level (n1 < n2 < ... < nN−1 < nN), the direct monetary prize increases with the
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hierarchical level (w2 − w1 < ... < wN−1 − wN−2 < wN − wN−1). Therefore, the
optimal wage structure is convex.
2.5 Extension 2: returns to effort increase with the hierarchical
level
In the previous subsection, we showed that if the number of people competing
increases with the hierarchical level, the optimal wage structure is convex. In
this subsection, we investigate whether another realistic extension that returns
to effort increase with the hierarchical level can also generate a convex wage
structure.
Let e∗k denote the optimal effort level associated with round k. Intuitively,
if returns to extra ability increase, then from a basic marginal benefit and cost
analysis it is optimal to induce more effort across rounds. Formally, we have the
following Lemma 2-3.
Lemma 2-3 If returns to efforts increase in rounds, then optimal effort level increases
in rounds too, i.e., e∗1 < e
∗
2 < ... < e
∗
N−1 < e
∗
N .
Example 1: Let us check a special case of a firm with only three hierarchies.
Assume that e∗1 < e
∗
2 = e
∗
3. We can show that the optimal wage structure is con-
vex. The promotion prizes from winning the last two rounds are the same and
they are greater than the promotion prizes in the first round, respectively. Intu-
itively, the option value from winning round 2, (1n (w3−w2)−c(e∗3)), is the same as
the option value from winning round 1, ( 1n ((w2 −w1)+ 1n (w3 −w2)− c(e∗3))− c(e∗2) =
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1
n (w3 − w2) − c(e∗2)), 9 since the effort levels are the same for round 2 and round 3.
Because the promotion prize from round 2 is greater than the promotion prize
from round 1 due to increasing optimal effort levels, the inter-rank prize in-
crease in round 2 is greater than the inter-rank prize increase in round 1. There-
fore, the optimal wage structure is convex.
Example 2: Let’s check a second special case of a firm with three effort levels
e∗1 < e
∗
2 < e
∗
3. We are interested in whether the convex wage structure still holds.
It is straightforward to prove that for round 2, w3 − w2 > w2 − w1 because of the
option value from winning the last round in the second round. Since e∗1 < e
∗
2, the
promotion prize from winning the second round is greater than the promotion
prize from round 1, i.e.,
(w2 − w1) + 1n (w3 − w2) − c(e
∗
3) > w1 +
1
n
((w2 − w1) + 1n (w3 − w2) − c(e
∗
3)) − c(e∗2).
It follows that (w2 −w1)−w1 > 1n ((w2 −w1)+ 1n (w3 −w2)− c(e∗3))− c(e∗2)− ( 1n (w3 −
w2) − c(e∗3)).
However, we cannot conclude that (w2−w1)−w1 > 0.Hence, the optimal wage
structure is not necessarily convex. One sufficient condition for the convex wage
structure (i.e., the inter-rank increase in level 2 is greater than the inter-rank
increase in level 1) is that the option value from winning round 2 is less than or
equal to the option value in level 1, i.e., ( 1n ((w2 −w1)+ 1n (w3 −w2)− c(e∗3))− c(e∗2)) ≥
( 1n (w3 − w2) − c(e∗3)).
Remark: the option prize is the difference between the expected earning
from winning subsequent rounds and the certain effort cost. The expected earn-
ings can be seen as the subsequent inter-rank prize and cost function discounted
9The expected earning from winning round 1 and the expected earning from winning round
2 are the same ( 1n (w3 − w2)) since e∗2 = e∗3.
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by the promotion rate 1n . If the expected earnings are small (or n is large) or the
effort cost increases sharply (c(e∗3) is much larger than c(e
∗
2)), then the option
value will be decreasing. Therefore, to keep the promotion prize increasing the
inter-rank prize must increase.
To characterize the optimal wage structure when the optimal effort level in-
creases with the hierarchical level, we apply the Bellman equation approach for
its tractability. Let Vk be the value to a worker when n−k possible rounds remain
to be played. As discussed in the benchmark model, the optimal wage structure
implements the optimal effort e∗k from all the workers in round k. Let p(ek|e−k)
be the probability of winning if a worker exerts effort ek in round k, while his
opponents exert effort e−k. We assume that the probability of winning increases
in effort p′(ek|e−k) > 0 and is convex p′′(ek|e−k) < 0.10 The symmetric equilibrium
indicates that p(e∗k|e∗−k) = 1n . For simplicity, we denote p′(e∗k+1) ≡
∂p(e∗k |e∗−k)
∂e∗k
.
Lemma 2-4 Let βk+1 = 1n −
c(e∗
k+1
)p′(e∗
k+1
)
c′(e∗
k+1
) ,
Vk = βk+1Vk+1 + (1 − βk+1)wk , for k = 1, 2, ...,N − 1.
It is obvious that Vk+1 > Vk > wk , otherwise the worker would not exert any
effort in the next round k + 1. It follows from Lemma 2-4 and Vk+1 > Vk > wk
that βk+1 = 1n −
c(e∗
k+1
)p′(e∗
k+1
)
c′(e∗
k+1
) > 0, i.e., c(e
∗
k+1
) − 1n
c′(e∗
k+1
)
p′(e∗
k+1
) > 0, which is also the sufficient
condition to use Bellman equation. From the Lemma 2-4, we can derive the
value of the inter-rank prizes as presented in Corollary 2-1.
10The assumption about probability of winning is consistent with Rosen (1986). Let p(ek) =
h(ek)
h(ek)+h(e−k) , where h(ek) is the effective effort and h(e−k) is his opponent’s effective effort. As in
Rosen (1986), it is assumed that h′(ek) > 0 and h′′(ek) < 0.
Remark: p′(ek) = h
′(ek)h(e−k)
[h(ek)+h(e−k)]2
> 0, p′′(ek) = h
′′
(ek)h(e−k)[h(ek)+h(e−k)]−2[h′(ek)]2h(e−k)
[h(ek)+h(e−k)]3
< 0
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Corollary 2-1
wN − wN−1 =
c′(e∗N)
p′(e∗N)
;
wk−1 − wk−2 =
c′(e∗k−1)
p′(e∗k−1)
− 1
n
c′(e∗k)
p′(e∗k)
+ c(e∗k), k = 3, ...,N.
From Corollary 2-1, (wN−wN−1)−(wN−1−wN−2) = c
′(e∗N )
p′(e∗N )
−( c′(e∗N−1)p′(e∗N−1)−
1
n
c′(e∗N )
p′(e∗N )
+c(e∗N)) >
0, since βk+1 > 0. The direct monetary reward increases in round N : wN − wN−1 >
wN−1−wN−2,which is consistent with the result from the first approach. However,
wk+1 − wk > wk − wk−1 does not necessarily hold for other rounds. The following
proposition 2-4 presents the sufficient and necessary conditions to generate the
convex wage structure.
Proposition 2-4 If 1) returns to effort increase in the hierarchical level, and
2) c
′(e∗k−1)
p′(e∗k−1)
− 1n
c′(e∗k)
p′(e∗k)
+ c(e∗k) >
c′(e∗k−2)
p′(e∗k−2)
− 1n
c′(e∗k−1)
p′(e∗k−1)
+ c(e∗k−1), k = 3, ...,N .
then the optimal wage structure is convex.
The option prize for round N − 1 is 1n (wN − wN−1) − c(e∗N) = 1n
c′(e∗N )
p′(e∗N )
− c(e∗N).
The option prize for round N−2 is 1n (wN−1−wN−2+ 1n (wN−wN−1)−c(e∗N))−c(e∗N−1) =
1
n (
c′(e∗N−1)
p′(e∗N−1)
− 1n
c′(e∗N )
p′(e∗N )
+ c(e∗N) +
1
n
c′(e∗N )
p′(e∗N )
− c(e∗N)) − c(e∗N−1) = 1n
c′(e∗N−1)
p′(e∗N−1)
− c(e∗N−1).
Analogously, we can prove that the option prize for round k is 1n
c′(e∗k+1)
p′(e∗k+1)
−c(e∗k+1).
Because c′(ek) increases in ek, and p′(ek) decreases in ek, c
′(ek)
p′(ek) increases in ek.
Since c
′(e∗k−1)
p′(e∗k−1)
>
c′(e∗k−2)
p′(e∗k−2)
as the optimal effort level increases with the hierarchical
level, Corollary 2-2 presents sufficient conditions for a convex wage structure to
hold.
Corollary 2-2 If 1) the returns to effort increase with the hierarchical level and
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2) the option prize decreases across rounds, i.e., 1n
c′(e∗k)
p′(e∗k)
− c(e∗k) ≤ 1n
c′(e∗k−1)
p′(e∗k−1)
− c(e∗k−1),
k = 2, ...,N,
then the optimal wage structure is convex.
The inequality 1n
c′(e∗k)
p′(e∗k)
−c(e∗k) ≤ 1n
c′(e∗k−1)
p′(e∗k−1)
−c(e∗k−1) holds if and only if c(e∗k)−c(e∗k−1) ≥
1
n (
c′(e∗k)
p′(e∗k)
− c′(e∗k−1)p′(e∗k−1) ). It holds if the cost function of effort increases faster than the
magnitude c
′(e∗k)
p′(e∗k)
increases. In other words, the optimal effort increases sharply
across levels ( c(e) increases sharply), i.e., the cost function is very steep ( c′(e)
is large) and c′(e) increases relatively less or c′′(e) is relatively small. (Or p′(e)
decreases at a slow rate or p′′(e) is relatively fat.)
It is straightforward that if the optimal effort level increases sharply with
the hierarchical level, then the optimal wage structure will be convex in order
to compensate the workers.
Example 2 (Continued): let us check the special example of a three-level hi-
erarchical firm with e∗1 < e
∗
2 < e
∗
3 . Assume for round k, the output yk is linear
in effort yk = ek + k, where k is a random variable following a uniform dis-
tribution in range [−a, a] with mean 0. f () = 12a . As shown in the proof of
Corollary 2-3 in appendix, in equilibrium p′(e∗k) =
1
2a . Suppose that c(ek) = (ek)
2.
c′(ek) = 2ek and c′′(ek) = 2. It follows that c
′(ek)
p′(ek) = 4aek. Therefore, w3 − w2 = 4ae3;
w2 −w1 = 4ae2 − 1n4ae3 + (e3)2;w1 = 4ae1 − 1n4ae2 + (e2)2. We have w3 −w2 > w2 −w1
because e3 > e2 and β3 = 1n − e34a > 0. It follows from β3 = 1n − e34a > 0 that all effort
levels are less than 1n4a, i.e., ek <
1
n4a, k = 1, 2 and 3.
The inter-rank prize difference between the first round and the second round
(w2 − w1) − w1(= 4a(e2 − e1) + (e3 + e2 − 1n4a)(e3 − e2)) is not necessarily positive.
Therefore, we demonstrate that Rosen’s (1986) conjecture is incorrect.
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We can provide a counterexample that the convex wage structure is not con-
vex. If e1 = a16n , e2 =
2a
16n , e3 =
3a
16n and n = 3, then w2 − w1 < w1. For this set
of parameters, the convex wage structure is not optimal because the effort cost
is increasing moderately and the promotion rate (13 ) is not small. On the other
hand, if e1 = a4n , e2 =
3a
4n , e3 =
5a
4n , then the optimal wage structure is convex. As
can be seen, the effort cost is increasing more sharply than in the counterexam-
ple.
The optimal structure is convex for example 2 if and only if
(w2 − w1) − w1 = 4a(e2 − e1) + (e3 + e2 − 1n4a)(e3 − e2) ≥ 0
One sufficient condition for the above inequality to hold is that e3 + e2 − 1n4a ≥ 0.
If the cost function is quadratic c(ek) = b(ek)2, where b (> 0) is a constant, and
the noise variable in linear output function follows the uniform distribution,
then the second condition in Proposition 2-4 implies that
4ab(e∗k−1 − e∗k−2) − 4abn (e∗k − e∗k−1) + b(e∗k − e∗k−1)(e∗k + e∗k−1) > 0.
From Corollary 2-2, it is sufficient to have that e∗k + e
∗
k−1 >
4a
n . Formally, we
have the following Corollary 2-3,
Corollary 2-3 If the returns to effort increase with the hierarchical level, if the cost
function of effort is quadratic: c(ek) = b(ek)2, where b (> 0) is a constant, and if
output yk is linear in effort yk = ek + k, where k follows an uniform distribution
in range [−a, a] with mean 0, k = 1, 2, ...,N, then the optimal wage structure is
convex if the following condition is satisfied: e∗k + e
∗
k−1 ≥ 4an where k = 3, ...,N.
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Intuitively, when the variance of the production function (or a) is not large
compared with the effort levels and when the promotion rate (1n ) is low, then the
option value decreases across rounds due to increasing effort cost. Therefore,
to induce increasing effort levels, the direct monetary prize increases and the
optimal wage structure is convex.
2.6 Conclusion and discussion
Empirical evidence shows that the wage structure is usually convex. One suf-
ficient condition for convex wage structure is that the option prize decreases
across rounds. We analyze two possible realistic extensions in multi-round pro-
motion tournaments that may generate a convex wage structure. The first ex-
tension is that, if the number of workers competing increases with hierarchical
levels, then the optimal wage structure is convex, because the option prize de-
creases across rounds. Second, if the returns to effort increase with the hierarchi-
cal level, then the optimal wage structure is not convex. This result proves that
Rosen’s (1986) conjecture is incorrect. The optimal wage structure is convex if
we make additional assumptions about cost functions and promotion functions.
For example, if the cost function is quadratic, the production technology is lin-
ear in effort, and the noise for production is small, then the direct monetary
prize increases with the hierarchical level.
Our research provides empirical predictions for future research. First, for
similar firms, if the promotion rate decreases more sharply with hierarchical
levels within one firm than within other firms, then according to our theories,
the optimal wage structure should be more convex for that firm than for other
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firms. Second, if the required effort levels rise more sharply with hierarchical
levels in one firm than within other firms, then we predict that the wage struc-
ture is more convex. With data available, we can test empirically whether the
two extensions proposed above can actually generate convex wage structures.
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CHAPTER 3
EX ANTE OR EX POST FAIRNESS CONCERNS: EXPERIMENTAL
EVIDENCE
3.1 Introduction
It is well documented in experimental and empirical studies that people do
not only care about their own payoff but also care about other people’s payoff.
In other words, fairness views play an important part in people’s preferences.
When people face uncertainties in a social context, how will their fairness con-
cerns and risk attitudes affect their decisions? For example, if a central planner
(CP) designs a housing contract for workers, the CP must choose between two
options for new housing because of limited resources. On one hand, CP can
build an average quality housing, in which case everyone will have the same
housing. On the other hand, CP can use the same resources to build new high-
quality housing, but not everyone can have the housing. The housing is allo-
cated via lottery and everyone has an equal opportunity to get a high-quality
house. How should the CP plan to build the housing? Should the CP design
the contract which guarantees everyone the same average quality housing con-
dition ex post (equality of outcome) or should the CP design the high-quality
housing and then let workers draw lotteries and decide who will live in a high-
quality house (equality of opportunity). Which contract makes workers better
off? Whether the CP chooses the first option or the second option depends on
workers’ fairness views. Consider another situation. If an principal relies on an
agent to make a decision choice in a risky context, the agent’s choice does not
only affect his/her own payoff but also the principal’s payoff. Will the agent
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choose the allocation that offers both of them equal probability of winnings or
will the agent choose the allocation that offers them exactly the same payoff no
matter which state occurs? In general, do people focus on ex post allocations
or ex ante allocations? In other words, do people value equality of outcome or
value equality of opportunity?
The model of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is widely ap-
plied to the literature of other-regarding preferences. This study can also be
conducted under the framework of inequity aversion. If people take the ex post
fairness perspective, they choose the allocation which maximizes the expecta-
tion of the ex post utility or minimizes the expectation of the ex post payoff
differences among people. On the other hand, if they adopt the ex ante fairness
perspective, they hope to minimize the expected payoff differences among peo-
ple. Will an ex ante fairness view or an ex post fairness view affect their decision
making? Specifically, if people dislike payoff inequalities or are inequity averse,
will they take account of the expectation of payoff differences among people
(an ex post fairness view) or the differences of expected payoffs among people
(an ex ante view)? Do people prefer equal opportunities among them or prefer
equal outcomes?
Many experimental and theoretical studies on social preferences occur in
deterministic environments. Whether people in society adopt an ex ante or
an ex post fairness view is rarely studied. There are some studies on dictator
games under the veil of ignorance and on probabilistic dictator game. (Kariv
and Zame, 2009, Karni et al., 2008, Bohnet et al., 2008, Kircher et al. 2009, and
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2010). They found that many subjects would assign an
equal opportunity of winning both to themselves and to others in a dictator
60
game. Cappelen et al. (2011) also conducted an experiment to test whether
people focus on ex ante opportunities or ex post outcomes when they make de-
cision under uncertainty. In their model, they chose different reference points
for an ex ante view and an ex post view. By contrast, this experiment follows
standard definitions of ex ante and ex post fairness views and use an online
experiment to analyze whether people focus on ex ante or on ex post fairness
views. Saito (2012) models preferences for equal opportunities and equal out-
comes. Specifically, he introduces one’s own expected payoff and the expected
payoff of others’ into the utility function and provides unified explanations for
the dictator game with uncertainties. The issue of social preference under un-
certainty has both important theoretical and empirical implications. In the the-
oretical literature of other regarding preferences, it is often assumed that people
maximize the expectation of their ex post utility function. However, there is
little evidence for this implicit assumption in the literature. This chapter aims
to present experimental evidence in this aspect. Meanwhile, the assumption of
an ex ante fairness view could greatly simplify the theoretical analysis if more
evidence for an ex ante fairness view was found. Under this assumption we
only need to compare expected payoff differences, but for an ex post fairness
view we need to consider payoff differences in every case. Empirically, this has
important implications for public policies. A better understanding of people’s
fairness preferences with uncertainties will help policy makers decide whether
they should focus on ex ante fairness criterion or ex post fairness criterion.
It is difficult to test ex ante and ex post fairness views with non-experimental
data, because other noise variables in the field may also affect people’s deci-
sions in a social context such as income, social identity or various demographic
factors. Besides, it is hard to tell whether people focus on ex ante allocation
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differences or ex post allocation differences given different framing effects. The
design of the experiment can avoid these problems, because the experiment can
provide a clean environment to focus only on ex ante or ex post fairness views.
Specifically, this online survey includes 12 hypothetical questions and some
brief demographic questions. For the hypothetical questions, the subjects were
asked to choose allocations not only for himself/herself but also for the other
person who was randomly paired with him/her. Specifically, the subjects were
asked to compare the option in the question with a list of alternative options.
Essentially, the subjects played the dictator game.
To test an ex post fairness view, I designed two sets of questions. The al-
ternative given in each question was uncertain and provided two people with
different payoffs in two equally probable states. The subjects compared this
uncertain allocation with a list of certain payoffs which could provide the two
people equal payoffs. Therefore, I can elicit the subjects’ certainty equivalent
for the uncertain allocation. By comparing certainty equivalents from the two
sets of question, I can evaluate whether the ex ante or ex post fairness views
played a role in subjects’ decision making. For one set of questions, the alter-
natives offered the two people equal payoffs in each state. For another set of
questions, the alternatives offered the two people unequal payoffs in each state
but the same expected payoff. If the participants took an ex post fairness view
or derived disutility from ex post unequal payoffs, then the certainty equiva-
lent for the uncertain allocation with equal payoffs for two people in each state
(no ex post differences) should be higher than the certainty equivalent for the
uncertain allocation with unequal payoffs (with ex post differences) for the two
people in each state. The following screenshot is a question in the survey elicit-
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ing subjects’ certainty equivalent. The alternative given in the question is both
ex ante and ex post fair.
I only focus on the subjects who behaved monotonically with the options
in the questions. For example, if the lowest value they chose was $6 for sure,
then the subjects in the sample would also choose $8 and $10 (the options with
values higher than $6). In this case the certainty equivalent lies between $4 and
$6. To simplify the analysis, I took the lowest value of choices as their CE. 1 In
the above example, if a subject chose $6, $8, $10, then the certainty equivalent
was $6.
The challenge is to test an ex ante fairness view. Because an ex ante unfair al-
location is also ex post unfair, it is difficult to tell whether the subjects adopted
an ex ante fairness view or an ex post fairness view when they faced ex ante
unfair allocations. I utilize environmental cues to capture the ex ante and ex
post fairness views. Specifically, the subjects were randomly divided into three
groups by their birthdays. For the control group, there were no remarks about
the alternatives the subject faced. For one treatment group, a remark was made
1I can also choose midpoint of the interval (the lowest value of option chosen and highest
value of option nonchosen) as the CE. The statistical results stay the same except estimated CE.
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on ex post differences of the alternatives. For the other treatment group, a re-
mark was made about the ex ante differences of the alternatives. These remarks,
or environmental cues called ”primes”, could temporarily render certain factors
salient. For example, if people adopted an ex ante fairness view, and if the prim-
ing effects did exist in this online survey, then the results from the treatment
group priming on ex ante differences would show that the certainty equivalent
for the ex post-different-and-ex ante-equal-allocation was closer to the certainty
equivalent for the ex post and ex ante equal alternative than the other treatment
group and the control group.
The regression results indicate that the ex post fairness concern does affect
subjects’ decision making. The difference between the certainty equivalent for
an ex post fair allocation and the certainty equivalent for its corresponding ex
post unfair allocation is statistically significant at the 5% level or the 10% level.
For example, an allocation assigns ($10, $10) with a 50% probability and ($0, $0)
with a 50% probability, while the other allocation assigns ($10, 0) with a 50%
probability and ($0, $10) with a 50% probability. Then the CE for the second
allocation is around $.51 higher than the first allocation. These results diverge
from the inequity aversion model (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). It seemed that the
subjects obtained positive utility from payoff differences. Remarks on ex post
payoff differences or ex ante differences may slightly change people’s behavior.
However, the differences are not statistically significant either. I also conduct
some demographic analysis on fairness concerns. However, the results are not
statistically significant either. The results should be interpreted with caution.
The insignificance of the results is because of the relatively small sample size.
The statistical insignificance may be also due to the coarseness of the data. I
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also calculate the upper bound of the ex post fairness concerns and the priming
effects. For example, if a subject chooses the options with $6, $8 and $10 for
sure, when the subject faces the ex post different alternative: ($10, $0) with a
50% probability (in the brackets, the first number is the payoff for the chooser
and the second number is the payoff for the other person) and ($0, $10) with a
50% probability, the lower bound of the certainty equivalent is $4. If a subject
chooses the options that guarantee $6, $8 and $10 for sure when the subject
faces the ex post fair alternative: ($0, $0) with a probability of 50% and ($10,
$10) with a probability of 50%. The upper bound of the certainty equivalent is
$6. I compare the lower bound of the certainty equivalent interval of the ex post
unfair allocation and the upper bound of the certainty equivalent interval of the
ex post fair allocation and I find that the differential between the upper bound
and lower bound is statistically significant. This result indicates that the ex post
fairness concerns may affect people’s decision making.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes a theoretical frame-
work for testing ex ante and ex post fairness views. Section 2.3 presents the
online survey design. Section 2.4 presents the results from the online survey.
Section 2.5 concludes Chapter 2. The appendix presents a sample survey.
3.2 A Theoretical Framework
In this section, I outline the inequity aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and I analyze ex ante and ex post fairness views under this setting.
Suppose that there are two people denoted by A and B. Suppose (xA, xB) is
an allocation profile that offers person A $xA and person B $xB. I assume that
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people have other-regarding preferences. Specifically, I assume that people are
inequity averse to payoff differences and person A’s utility function is
UA(xA, xB) = uA(xA) + γA f (xA, xB), (3.1)
where the function γA f (xA, xB) captures A′s fairness concern for B and
the parameter γA measures A’s weight on fairness. I assume that
f (xA, xB)

= 0 i f xA = xB
, 0 i f xA , xB
. If A and B have equal payoffs, then there is no disu-
tility incurred to A. If A’s payoff is different from B’s payoff, then the different
payoff will incur a utility to A. If A is inequity-averse to payoff, then difference
of payoff will pose a disutility on A, or f (xA, xB) < 0. Generally, I assume that
the larger the payoff differences the higher the disutility level, i.e., | f (xA, xB)|
increases as |xA − xB| increases. Most other-regarding literature supports this as-
sumption. If A enjoys payoff differences, then the payoff difference will cause
positive utility to A, or f (xA, xB) > 0. Generally, it is assumed that f increases
as xA − xB increases. Some literature is consistent with this view. For example,
status-seeking literature assumes that people enjoy being paid more than their
coworkers. Here I assume that f (xA, xB) < 0 i f xA , xB or workers are inequity
averse. I will test this null hypothesis later.
Definition of ex-ante and ex-post fairness views
Ex-post fairness view: If A takes an ex post fairness view, A chooses allocations
by maximizing the expectation of the ex post utility, i.e.,
max EUex postA (xA, xB) = max EuA(xA) + γAE f (xA, xB).
In the literature this ex post form of utility functions is widely applied.
Ex-ante fairness view: If A takes an ex ante fairness view A chooses allocations
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by maximizing the utility including the expectation of payoff comparisons, i.e.,
max EUex anteA (xA, xB) = max EuA(xA) + γA f (ExA, ExB).
If people take an ex-ante fairness view, then payoffs generated from equal
opportunities will not have an impact on their utility.
Let us consider some special allocations (G1), (G2) and (G3) :
(G1) : An uncertain allocation offers (x1, x1) with a 50% probability and offers
(x2, x2) with a 50% probability. Without loss of generality, let x1 > x2.
(G2) : An uncertain allocation offers (x1, x2) with a 50% probability and offers
(x2, x1) with a 50% probability.
(G3) : A sure allocation (x˜, x˜).
Both allocations (G1) and (G2) offer the same expected payoff ( 12 x1 +
1
2 x2) to
both people. The allocation (G1) offers equal payoffs to the two people no matter
which state occurs, hence allocation (G1) is both ex ante fair and ex post fair. Put
differently, people with an ex ante fairness view and people with an ex post
fairness view derive the same utility from (G1), i.e.,
EUex postA (G1) = EU
exante
A (G1) = EuA(G1) =
1
2
uA(x1) +
1
2
uA(x2).
An allocation (G2) offers the same expected payoffs but different ex post payoffs
for the two people, so it is ex ante fair but ex post unfair. In other words, the
allocation (G2) provides an equal opportunity for the two people. If A takes an
ex post fairness view, then
EUex postA (G2) =
1
2
uA(x1) +
1
2
uA(x2) + γAE f (x1, x2).
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If A takes an ex ante fairness view, then
EUex anteA (G2) = EuA(G2) =
1
2
uA(x1) +
1
2
uA(x2).
The sure allocation (G2) is both ex ante and ex post fair, so
EUex postA (G3) = EU
ex ante
A (G3) = uA(x˜).
If A adopts an ex post fairness view and if A is inequity-averse, then A prefers
(G1) to (G2) since EU
ex post
A (G1) > EU
ex post
A (G2). On the other hand, if A adopts
an ex ante fairness view, then A is indifferent between (G1) and (G2) since
EUex anteA (G1) = EU
ex ante
A (G2).
Let uA(x˜1, x˜1) ≡ EUex postA (G1) and let uA(x˜2, x˜2) ≡ EUex postA (G2), or I say (G1)′s
certainty equivalent is (x˜1, x˜1) and (G2)′s certainty equivalent is (x˜2, x˜2). It follows
from EUex postA (G1) > EU
ex post
A (G2) that the certainty equivalent for (G1) is greater
than the certainty equivalent for (G1) from an ex post fairness view, i.e., x˜1 >
x˜2. By eliciting and comparing the certainty equivalent from (G1) and (G2), I can
derive whether people hold ex ante or ex post fairness views. This is the main
idea of the survey design.
3.3 Online Survey Design
The survey comprises 12 multiple choice questions, followed by a short survey
including some demographic questions. For the online survey, the participants
made choices not only for himself/herself but also for another person randomly
paired with him/her. Essentially, for this online survey all the subjects played
dictator games. The participants were told that the payoffs of all their decisions
were final and that there cannot be any transfers. To solely focus on the fairness
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concerns and avoid reputation effects, the participants were also informed that
their decisions were completely anonymous to the other person.
The first three questions were designed to test whether the subjects have
other regarding preferences. The remaining questions were designed to elicit
certainty equivalents for different alternatives. Specifically, the subjects were
presented with an uncertain alternative in a question and were asked to com-
pare it with a list of certain options, which consists of five or more monotoni-
cally increasing options guaranteeing both people equal payoffs. The subjects
were asked to choose all the options in the list preferred to the alternative in the
question. If the subjects behaved monotonically and if they chose an option in
the list, then any option with a sure value greater than the value of that option
should be chosen as well. I only focus on the subjects who behaved monotoni-
cally so that I can eliminate inattentive responses submitted by the subjects. For
the uncertain alternatives, the statement on tossing a coin was used to let par-
ticipants better understand the probability of each state. The subjects read that
”Suppose a coin is tossed. A head and a tail occur with an equal probability.
(50%).” To remind the participants that more than one answer may be selected,
one example was given on purpose before participants started to answer the
questions.
Three pairs of questions are designed to elicit the certainty equivalents for
uncertain alternatives of different values. Each pair includes a question about ex
ante and ex post fair uncertain alternatives (G1). Consider the following screen-
shot of question 4.
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For every question, I offered a five-item list to elicit their cutting point. This
multiple-choice list is commonly used in the literature.2
This certainty equivalent would then be compared to the certainty equiva-
lent for the corresponding uncertain alternative ($0, $10) with a 50% probabil-
ity and ($10, $0) with a 50% probability. If the subjects disregarded the other
person, then the certainty equivalent would be the same for the above two un-
certain alternatives, since the payoffs of the choosers were the same for the two
alternatives. However, the certainty equivalents might be different if the sub-
jects cared about their partner’s payoff. As explained in section 2, if the subjects
disliked ex post payoff differences, then the certainty equivalent for the alterna-
tive ($0, $10) with a 50% probability and ($10, $0) with a 50% probability (G2)
should be less than the certainty equivalent for the alternative ($0, $0) with a
50% probability and ($10, $10) with a 50% probability (G1).
As discussed in the introduction, to better distinguish whether an ex ante or
ex post fairness view affected their decision making, the subjects were divided
2I didn’t ask for free response from subjects, because it is difficult to analyze free-response
data and to elicit it in a useful way. I was also worried that subjects may offer irrational or
unreasoning answers A list of options may refine their answers to more sensible ones.
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to three groups based on their birthdays. The three groups faced the same ques-
tions, but their framing is different.
The first group whose birthdays fall between the 1st and 10th day of the
month is the control group. The following is a screenshot of a question for the
control group. As can be seen, the framing of the question is the same as the
question of the first screenshot.
The second group of subjects whose birthdays fall between the 11th day and
20th day of the month is the first treatment group. They are also called the ex
post group because there was a remark describing the ex post differentials of the
alternatives in questions. As shown in the screenshot below, the subjects in this
treatment were clearly informed how much more and how much less they earn
in each state of the alternative. The remark is designed to render ex post payoff
differentials more salient. If the effects of priming are salient and if subjects in
the treatment group hold an ex post fairness view, then the certainty equivalent
for the ex post unfair alternative (G2) is less than the certainty equivalent for the
same alternative (G2) for the subjects in the control group.
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Remaining subjects are the second treatment group or the ex ante group.
For this group, the subjects were informed explicitly the expected value of the
uncertain alternative in the question. As the following screen shot shows, there
was a remark about the ex ante payoff differential. This remark is designed
to trigger an ex ante fairness concern. If the effects of priming were salient,
the differentials of certainty equivalents of (G2) were smaller for this treatment
group than the differentials of certainty equivalents of (G2) in the control group.
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3.4 Data Descriptions
3.4.1 Subjects
Invitation emails for participating in the online survey were sent to around 4000
potential subjects by Cornell Lab for Experimental Economics and Decision Re-
search. 144 participants submitted the online survey. On average, they spent
10 minutes doing the survey. Most participants (over 90%) are Cornell staff or
students. 122 participants behaved monotonically with certainty equivalents
and they are the subjects of our study.3 Table 3-1 summarizes some basic demo-
graphic data of these 122 subjects.
I also obtained the following information.
Email. The survey was conducted online remotely and thus email address
was used to identify participation, so participants were required to leave their
email if they hoped to collect their payments. 97 left their email address and
more than 92 subjects were Cornell affiliated.
Highest education level. 24 subjects graduated from high schools, 18 subjects
are at the Associate level, 46 subjects obtained a Bachelor’s degree and 31 sub-
jects are at the graduate level.
Concern for others. I asked them whether they considered others’ payoff when
they made decisions for the multiple choice questions and rated their concern
for others on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 represents zero weight on the other
person’s payoff at all, 5 represents an equal weight on him/herself and the other
3I dismissed the survey results of the remaining 22 subjects who did not behave monotoni-
cally, because they may have not paid enough attention when they completed the survey.
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person, and 10 represents zero weight on themselves and all weight on others.
On average, the weight of concern for others is 5.7. Out of 122 subjects, 8 did
not consider others’ payoff at all and 13 subjects only considered others’ payoff
when they make choices.
Ex ante fairness concern. The survey also asked our subjects whether they
thought it was fair that everyone had an equal probability of winning, but some
of them may end up with nothing due to bad luck. They were asked to rate
on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 represents that they thought it was not fair at all
and 10 represents that they thought it was very fair. Five subjects chose 0 and
considered it to be completely unfair, while 23 subjects chose 10 and considered
it to be very fair.
3.4.2 Compensation
Invitation emails informed the potential subjects that every participant who
submitted the survey would be eligible to receive $3 participation fee plus a
12% chance to win $25. Two 6-hour time windows were scheduled for partici-
pants to collect payments. 59 people came to collect their payments and among
them 9 people won $25.
3.5 Results
In this section, I first present some descriptive results, then I check the consis-
tency of subjects’ behavior. The main results of the regression are shown at the
end of the section.
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3.5.1 Basic Descriptive Results
I elicited CE for 6 questions respectively, which can be sorted into three question
pairs (QPs):
QP 1: G1 ($0, $0)50%+($10, $10)50% and G2 ($10, $0)50%+($0, $10)50%;
QP 2: G1 ($10, $10)50%+($20, $20)50% and G2 ($10, $20)50%+($20, $10)50%;
QP 3: G1 ($15, $15)50%+($30, $30)50% and G2 ($15, $30)50%+($30, $15)50%.
Because the options given in the questions are not continuous, only the in-
terval of certainty equivalent can be identified. For example, if the subject chose
options with values $6, $8, and $10 when his choice set was a list of options with
values $2, $4, $6, $8 and $10, then his certainty equivalent lies between $4 and
$6. I take the midpoint of the interval $5 as the certainty equivalent.
Table 2 presents the basic results of certainty equivalents of six questions and
the results are within subjects. The values in the last column are the differentials
of the certainty equivalents of the ex post fair alternatives (G1) and the certainty
equivalents of the ex post unfair alternatives (G2). The standard errors of differ-
ential are less than the standard errors of the Mean CE for G1 and G2 because
subjects’ choice of (G1) and (G2) are positively correlated. All the differentials
are statistically significant at 10%. Interestingly, the certainty equivalent for (G1)
is slightly less than the certainty equivalent for (G2). The subjects may be in
favor of ex post unfairness. This result does not support the model of inequity
aversion. (I also test the upper bound of the ex post unfairness concern. Please
see the appendix for more detail.)
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3.5.2 Consistency Check
In this section, I check whether the subjects behaved consistently through the
survey. In general, if subjects behave randomly, for example, people had higher
CE for (G1) with 50% probability and had higher CE for (G2) with 50% proba-
bility, then behaviors of the subjects were just noise and the results from regres-
sion would not be conclusive. Therefore, I check whether the subjects behaved
consistently by Fisher’s exact test. The p-values of Fisher’s exact test strongly
support that subjects behaved consistently, and that the data from the survey is
credible.
First I compare the mean CE for (G1) and (G2) in each PQ for every subject.
Figure 3-1 summarizes the directions of their preferences with respect to ex post
fairness concern. For example, The figure shows that 12 subjects (10% of 122
subjects) had higher CE for (G1) in QP1 (($0, $0) with 50% and ($10, $10) with
50%) than CE for (G2) in QP1 (($0, $10) with 50% and ($10, $0)) with 50%), while
23 subjects behaved otherwise. Note that a majority of people (71%) had the
same CE for (G1) and (G2).
Because subjects may behave randomly across question pairs, which may
undermine the explanation of these results, I check whether the subjects be-
haved consistently across question pairs. I count the frequency that a subject
behaved consistently. For example, if a subject chose higher CE for G1 in PQ1
and PQ2, but chose higher CE for G2 in PQ 3, then the subject had higher CE for
G1 with a probability of two thirds.
If a subject behaved independently across QPs, then I can calculate the pre-
dicted frequency table (table 3-3) from the histogram figure (3-1). For example,
76
the number of subjects who never had higher CE for G1 is (1−10%)(1−16%)(1−
8%) ∗ 122 = 85 if subjects behaved randomly across PQs.
Table 3-4 summarizes the observed or actual frequency of subjects’ prefer-
ences across QPs. For example, 91 subjects never chose a higher CE for G1 in
all the three PQs and 25 subjects chose higher CE for G1 in only one of the three
PQs. 4 subjects strictly preferred ex post fair allocations in all three QPs while 8
subjects had higher CE for G2 in all three PQs.
Now I compare the predicted preferences and the observed preferences. Ta-
ble 3-5 shows the p-value of Fisher’s exact test. According to the p-value of
Fisher’s exact test, the second and the third comparisons strongly reject the null
hypothesis that subjects behaved randomly across the question pairs. Collec-
tively, table 3-5 indicates a strong rejection of the null hypothesis. Hence, the
subjects behaved consistently across the question pairs.
3.5.3 Basic Regression Results
These three QPs are pooled together to maximize the statistical power. Three
PQs are pooled to run regression.
CE = αi + µI(ex post fair)
where the dummy variable I(ex post fair)=

1, if the allocation is an ex post fair allocation
0, otherwise.
and where αi is the fixed effect for QP i and µmeasures the magnitude of ex post
fairness. Table 3-6 shows the results of the regression.
Column (1) to column (4) show the regression results of OLS. Because the
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subjects’ choice set is a set of intervals, the subjects’ certainty equivalent cannot
be precisely identified. Therefore, besides OLS, I also use an interval regression
(Steward 1983), which offers the Tobit estimator when the dependent variable
falls within an interval. The results of the interval regression are listed in column
(5) to column (8). The results of OLS and interval regression are very similar
both in magnitude and direction, therefore I can only focus on the results of the
interval regression, specifically column (8).
1. Ex post fairness concerns
The value of the ex post fairness coefficient is above −.51,which is significant
at the 5% level. Surprisingly, subjects had lower certainty equivalent for an ex
post fair alternative than that for the corresponding ex ante fair alternative. It
seemed that for the experiment, people preferred ex post unfair outcome. This
finding contradicts some findings of previous experimental literature that peo-
ple have fairness concerns or are inequity-averse. This result indicates that sub-
jects preferred equal opportunities to equal outcomes, or subjects may dislike
payoff equality and may prefer payoff differences.
2. Concern for others
In the survey, subjects were also asked how much they cared for others when
they made the decisions on a scale of 1 to 10. The coefficient is −.20 and is statis-
tically significantly at the 1% level. The care for others is negatively correlated
with the certainty equivalent. In other words, the more people cared for others,
the lower the certainty equivalent they asked for.
3. Economic major or minor
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Table 6 shows that when subjects with a background of economics major or
minor have higher CE by more than $2, which is statistically significant at the
1% level. This result is consistent with some studies that students who had a
background in economics tend to be more self-interested and care for higher
payoff.
4. Gender
The male subjects have slightly lower certainty equivalent than the female
subjects slightly more than $.20, but the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant. Given that the standard errors are above 0.3, the experiment did not have
enough statistical power to reject the null hypothesis.
5. Age
Age is positively correlated with the certainty equivalent. The coefficient is
.19 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. Senior subjects chose a higher
certainty equivalent than young subjects.
6. Ex ante fairness concern
The ex-ante fairness coefficient is −0.1 and is significant at the 10% level. It
means the fairer people thought an equal opportunity was, the lower the cer-
tainty equivalent.
7. Priming effects
Table 6 also shows that the ex post differential salient treatment reduces the
certainty equivalent by $.34 while the ex ante differential salient treatment has
no effect on CE. The direction of priming is consistent with the inequity aver-
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sion model, which predicts that with salient ex post differences inequity-averse
people would choose lower certainty equivalents. Meanwhile, the ex ante dif-
ferences are 0 in all three question pairs, and therefore did not affect people’s
certainty equivalent. But results of both treatments are not statistically signifi-
cant. Given that the standard errors are above 0.3, the experiment did not have
enough statistical power to reject the null hypothesis.
I test whether the priming effects are significant within or between groups.
The following table 3-7 presents the certainty equivalents and differentials
within subjects. There are 47 observations in the control group, 37 observations
in the ex post treatment group and 38 observations in the ex ante treatment
group.
The null hypothesis in each PQ is that the mean of certainty equivalent is the
same for the alternatives (G1) and (G2) within subjects. Under the null hypoth-
esis the differential of the certainty equivalent between (G1) and (G2) is zero.
From the table, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level of sig-
nificance. Interestingly, for the ex ante treatment group and the control group
the mean of certainty equivalent for (G2) is greater than the certainty equivalent
for (G1). It seems that the subjects enjoyed ex post payoff differentials when the
subjects were reminded the expected value for the alternative. In most cases,
the mean of the certainty equivalent is greater for the ex post treatment group
than that of the control group. In other words, subjects were not averse to the
ex post differentials in the survey.
To check whether priming has any effect on the decision of the subjects, I
compare the certainty equivalents for the same alternatives with different fram-
ing across the three groups. Table 3-8 reports the certainty equivalents of the
80
three groups when they face different framing of the same questions. The num-
bers in the parentheses are standard errors.
The null hypothesis is that the means of certainty equivalents are the same
for the same alternative with different framing across the three groups. Table
3-9 summarizes the differentials of the certainty equivalents between the three
groups. Again the numbers in the parentheses are the P-values (two-tailed test
at the 5% significant level). Panel A shows the results when the subjects chose
the certainty equivalent for the alternative which offered ($0, $10) and ($10, $0)
with a 50% probability. In the presence of the salient ex post differential, the
certainty equivalent is less than the certainty equivalents in the control group.
(This property also holds for Panel B and Panel C). It seems that the subjects
were more averse to ex post differentials when they were reminded the ex post
differentials. The priming of ex post differences did change the subjects’ behav-
ior slightly. However, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% signifi-
cant level. As also can be seen in Panel A, when the subjects were told explicitly
that the expected payoffs of the alternative were the same for the two people,
the certainty equivalent is higher than that of the control group. This result
indicates that the priming of the ex ante differential may affect the subjects’ de-
cision. However, it is not statistically significant. This is also true for Panel B.
But in Table 3-7 the certainty equivalent for the ex ante treatment group is less
than the certainty equivalent in the control group. Table 3-9 also shows that
the certainty equivalent in the ex ante treatment group is greater than the cer-
tainty equivalent in ex post group, which is consistent with the prediction of
our model. However, the result is not statistically significant either.
Three more alternatives were designed as both ex ante and ex post unfair.
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The differentials of certainty equivalents between subjects are not statistically
significant either. (Tables are omitted.) The above analysis from the tables
demonstrates that the priming effects are not statistically significant.
3.5.4 Some Regression Results by Demographic Groups
Now I hope to examine results by demographic group to determine whether
the differences across groups are significant. The basic results are shown in
Table 3-10. According to Panel A, male subjects asked for higher CEs for ex
post fair allocations than female subjects. Panel B shows that subjects with a
college education or higher asked for higher CE for ex post fair allocations than
less educated subjects. However, due to large standard errors, the experiment
is under-powered.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The results from this online survey show that ex post and ex ante fairness views
are not very important in people’s decision making. While priming on the ex
post payoff differentials may induce disutility, the result is not statistically sig-
nificant. Remarks about expected payoff would not change people’s behavior
in this social context. Interestingly, the results indicate that people may enjoy ex
post differentials when subjects are pooled together.
There are some limitations of my design. 1) The subjects were not paid
by the actual value in the hypothetical questions. So the fixed payments may
not well incentivize the subjects. 2) Some routine experiments should have be
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conducted, so that I could compare my results with those of previous stud-
ies. Otherwise, I could not show that the subjects in this study are compara-
ble with other subjects in other experiments. 3) For the hypothetical questions,
the stakes were small. Ex ante or ex post fairness concern may matter when
the subjects face higher stakes. 4) The results of ex ante and ex post fairness
concern are based on a within-subject design. The anchoring effect may affect
the results. For example, when the subjects chose from the alternatives they pre-
ferred to the option ($0, $10)50%+($10, $0)50%, the question ($15, $30)50%+($30,
$15)50% from the previous screen may affect their answer. The anchoring
effect might cause the certainty equivalent for ($0, $10)50%+($10, $0)50% to
be greater than the certainty equivalent for ($0, $0)50%+($10, $10)50%. Even
though the anchoring effect cannot directly explain why the certainty equiv-
alent for ($15, $30)50%+($30, $15)50% is greater than the certainty equivalent
for ($15, $15)50%+($30, $30)50%, I cannot rule out the anchoring affect on the
subjects’ decision. If I have a large enough sample, I can use between subject
design to avoid the anchoring effect. 5) Because the intervals listed in the multi-
ple choice question are tight and the standard error is very small, the power of
the test is almost 1. On the other hand, regression by demographic studies are
not significant because they lack statistical power. In the future, I should design
questions where the stakes are higher and increase the sample size. 6) Perhaps
the finding that people have a larger CE for G1 may actually reflect some sort of
ex post utilitarian concern. For example, under G1 the ex post sum of surplus is
($20, 1/2; $0, 1/2), whereas under G2 the ex post surplus is ($10, 1). It’s not clear
which of these an ex post utilitarian would prefer, but it’s a clear difference be-
tween G1 and G2. In my study, I ignored this difference. But it may affect my
result and I should explore it further in the future.
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I discussed the ex post fairness concern by comparing the certainty equiva-
lents of ex post fair and ex post unfair allocations. I could also ask the subjects to
compare the ex post fair and ex post unfair allocations directly. Then I can check
if the subjects behave consistently and if they have ex post fairness concern.
One interesting direction for future research would be to test the magnitude
of ex post and ex ante fairness concerns based on a specific functional form. For
example, let f (xA, xB) = {.−(xA − xB) i f xA > xB −β(xA − xB) i f xB > xA ,where β > 1
measures A’s loss aversion. I can consider the following utility function
EuA(xA) + γA f (xA, xB) + δA f (ExA, ExB). (3.2)
The utility of fairness can be decomposed into two components. The second
term in (3.2) measures the ex post fairness concerns and the third term measures
the ex ante fairness concerns. If δA is significantly different from zero, then an
ex ante fairness view plays a role in people’s preferences.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1 OF APPENDIX
A.1 Figure 1-1
Figure 1-1 Optimal expected wage when b1 varies
The two solid line segments describe the optimal expected wage levels with stan-
dard agents. The differential between the two solid line segments shows the expected
wage differential in the benchmark case. The dashed line denotes the expected wage
levels with inequity-averse agents. b2 is the critical value determining when the princi-
pal should apply an equal wage contract and an unequal wage contract. When b1 < b2,
the optimal wage levels are the same for both agents, which is represented by the thin
dashed line. When b1 > b2, the optimal wage levels start to diverge as b1 increases,
which is presented by two thick dashed lines Ewu1 and Ew
u
2.
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A.2 Figure 1-2
Figure 1-2 Optimal effort level when b1 varies
Figure 1-2 describes the optimal effort levels when I fix b2, β1 and α2; and
vary b1. The upper solid line and the lower flat solid line depict the effort level
for the high productivity worker 1 and for the low productivity worker 2 respec-
tively. The dotted line denotes the optimal effort levels with inequity aversion.
When b1 is small, or b2 < b1 < b2, the equal effort contract is optimal, which
is described by the thin dotted segment. When b1 goes above the threshold b2,
the unequal effort contract is optimal, which is described by the two thick dot-
ted segments. It can be clearly seen that the dashed line lies in between the
two solid lines, which implies that the effort levels are more compressed with
inequity-averse agents than with standard agents.
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A.3 Figure 1-3
Figure 1-3 Optimal effort level when α2 varies
Figure 1-3 depicts how α2 affects the optimal effort levels. I fix b1, b2, and β1
and b1 and vary α2. The upper and lower solid straight lines represent the opti-
mal effort levels in the benchmark model. When α2 < α2 such that b1 > b2 (i.e.,
the efficiency motive is strong), the optimal efforts are different for two agents.
The thick dashed lines represent the optimal unequal effort levels, which can be
implemented by an unequal wage contract. When α2 > α2 such that b1 < b2 (i.e.,
the equality motive is strong), the optimal effort levels are the same for the two
agents.
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A.4 Figure 1-4
Figure 1-4 Maximum profit level when β1 and α2 varies
The above figure shows how α2 affects profit levels for different levels of β1.
The three curves represent three cases β1 = 0, β1 = 0.1 and β1 = 0.2 respectively.
As can be seen for the three curves, the profit first falls then remains the same.
For example, if β1 = 0,the profit decreases with α2 when α2 < α2 = 0.1 (b1 > b2),
where the optimal wage contract is an unequal wage contract. The profit then
stays constant when α2 < α2 (b1 > b2). In addition, for the same value of α2, the
profit decreases with β1.
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A.5 Proof of Lemma 1-2
Lemma 1-2 Individual rationality constraints IRi, i = 1, 2 are binding for both agents.
Proof: I derive optimal contracts under three different cases Ew1 > Ew2,
Ew1 = Ew2, and Ew1 < Ew2.
1. If Ew1 > Ew2, (IRi), expected utility functions for agents become
EU1 = (1 − β1)Ew1 + β1Ew2 − c(e1) ≥ 0. (A.1)
EU2 = −α2Ew1 + (1 + α2)Ew2 − c(e2) ≥ 0. (A.2)
The above two inequalities and 1 + α2 − β1 > 0 imply
Ew2 ≥ α2c(e1) + (1 − β1)c(e2)1 + α2 − β1 . (A.3)
(A.1) and 1 − β1 > 0 imply Ew1 ≥ 11−β1 (c(e1) − β1Ew2). Adding Ew2 on both
sides yields
Ew1 + Ew2 ≥ 1 − 2β11 − β1 Ew2 +
1
1 − β1 c(e1).
Substituting (A.3) into the above inequality and 1 − 2β1 > 0 yields
Ew1 + Ew2 ≥ 2α2 + 1
α2 − β1 + 1c(e1) +
1 − 2β1
1 + α2 − β1 c(e2). (A.4)
Since the principal chooses to maximize the profits, in other words, minimize
the costs, here, wages. Hence (A.4) must be binding, i.e., individual rationality
constraints are binding for both agents:
Ew1 =
1
1 + α2 − β1 ((1 + α2)c(e1) − β1c(e2)). (A.5)
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Ew2 ≥ α2c(e1) + (1 − β1)c(e2)1 + α2 − β1 . (A.6)
2. If Ew1 = Ew2, agents’ utility functions are simplified to EU1 = Ew1−c(e1) ≥
0 and EU2 = Ew2 − c(e2) ≥ 0. Since the cost is minimized in the optimal
contract, the above two IR constraints are binding. It follows that Ew1 =
c(e1), Ew2 = c(e2) and so c(e1) = c(e2).
3. If Ew1 < Ew2, the analysis is identical to the case (1), i.e., IR constraints are
binding and

Ew1 = 11+α1−β2 (α1c(e2) + (1 − β2)c(e1))
Ew2 = 11+α1−β2 ((1 + α1)c(e2) − β2c(e1))
.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 1-1
Corollary 1-1 Ew1 R Ew2, if and only if e1 R e2.
Proof: From the lemma 1-2,
1. If Ew1 > Ew2, i.e., 11+α2−β1 ((1+α2)c(e1)−β1c(e2)) > 11+α2−β1 (α2c(e1)+(1−β1)c(e2)),
which implies e1 > e2.
2. If Ew1 = Ew2, i.e., c(e1) = c(e2) which implies e1 = e2.
3. If Ew1 < Ew2, i.e., 11+α1−β2 (α1c(e2)+(1−β2)c(e1)) < 11+α1−β2 ((1+α1)c(e2)−β2c(e1)),
which implies e1 < e2.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 1-3 and Lemma 1-4 and Proposition 1-2
Proposition 1-2 A principal contracts with two inequity-averse agents with heteroge-
neous productivities b1 > b2. Let b2 = 1+2α21−2β1 b2.
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1. When b1 ≤ b2, the optimal effort levels are the same and the principal chooses
an equal wage contract.
2. When b1 > b2, the optimal effort levels are different and the principal chooses
an unequal wage contract.
In both of the above cases, the principal earns less profit than in the benchmark case
with standard agents. Moreover, effort levels and wage levels are more compressed
than those of the benchmark.
Proof:
1. If Ew1 > Ew2, substituting (A.5) and (A.6) into the principal’s maximiza-
tion problem yields
max
e1,e2
b1e1 + b2e2 − 1+2α21+α2−β1 c(e1) −
1−2β1
1+α2−β1 c(e2).
Taking FOCs with respect to e1 and e2, I can derive the optimal efforts:
e∗1 =
1+α2−β1
1+2α2
b1 and e∗2 =
1+α2−β1
1−2β1 b2. It follows from Corollary 1-1 e
∗
1 > e
∗
2, and so
b1 > 1+2α21−2β1 b2. This is the parameter constraint that the unequal wage contract is
feasible for the principal.
A linear contract wi(xi) = aixi + ti can implement the optimal effort levels.
Since

e1 = (1 − β1)a1b1
e2 = (1 + a2)a2b2
, it follows

a1 =
1+α2−β1
(1+2α2)(1−β1)
a2 =
1+α2−β1
(1−2β1)(1+a2)
.
The firm obtains profit: Π1 =
1+α2−β1
2 (
(b1)2
1+2α2
+
(b2)2
1−2β1 ).
(A.5) and (A.6) imply
Ewu1 =
1
2
(1+α2−β1)(1+α2)
(1+2α2)2
(b1)2 − 12 (1+α2−β1)β1(1−2β1)2 (b2)2
Ewu2 =
1
2
(1+α2−β1)α2
(1+2α2)2
(b1)2 + 12
(1+α2−β1)(1−β1)
(1−2β1)2 (b2)
2
.
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If Ew1 = Ew2, Corollary 1-1 shows e1 = e2. The principal’s maximization
problem becomes max
e1,e2
b1e1 + b2e2 − c(e1) − c(e2) s.t e1 = e2.
The solution is ee1 = e
e
2 =
b1+b2
2 and the profit Π
e = 14 (b1 + b2)
2 .
The optimal expected wages are Ewe1 = Ew
e
2 =
1
2 (
b1+b2
2 )
2 =
(b1+b2)2
8 .
3 If Ew1 < Ew2, the analysis is identical to the first case, and so

e∗1 =
1+α1−β2
1−2β2 b1
e∗2 =
1+α1−β2
1+2α1
b2
.
It follows from Corollary 1-1 e∗1 < e
∗
2 and b1 <
1−2β2
1+2α1
b2(< b2).
If β2 > −α1, b1 < 1−2β21+2α1b2 < b2 contradicts b1 > b2. Therefore, when agent 1 is
more productive than agent 2, the principal would never offer higher wage to
agent 2 than agent 1.
When I compare the profits in three cases: 1) benchmark 2) the optimal
wages are equal, 3) the optimal wages are unequal. Πu−Πe = 14 ((1+2α2)b2−(1−2β1)b1)
2
(1−2β1)(2α2+1) ≥
0 if b1 > 1+2α21−2β1 b2. Π
B − Πu = 12 α2+β1(2α2+1)(1−2β1)
(
(1 − 2β1)b21 − (1 + 2α2)b22
)
implies that
ΠB − Πu > 0 if and only if b21 > 1−2β21+2α1b22.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 1-5
Proposition 1-5 There exists b1 such that for any b1 > b1, the principal would rather
hire a high productivity worker instead of both workers, holding all other param-
eters fixed.
92
Proof: Let’s explore the conditions when hiring a high productivity worker
is more profitable than hiring both workers: Π1−Πu = b212 − 1+α2−β12 ( (b1)
2
1+2α2
+
(b2)2
1−2β1 ) > 0.
Rearrange and simplify the above inequality, I obtain b1 >
√
(1+α2−β1)(2α2+1)
(α2+β1)(1−2β1) b2
Let b1 =
√
(1+α2−β1)(2α2+1)
(α2+β1)(1−2β1) b2.
Note a special case, if (1+α2−β1)(2α2+1)(α2+β1)(1−2β1) < (
1+2α2
1−2β1 )
2 or 1+α2−β1
α2+β1
> 1+2α21−2β1 , then b1 <
1+2α2
1−2β1 b2,which means that principal will only hire a high productivity agent for
any b2 > b1.
A.9 Proof of Corollary 1-3
Corollary 1-3 Suppose the synergy effect increases the marginal productivity of each
worker, i.e., xi = (bi + se j)ei + i. Let m = 2α2+1α2−β1+1 and n =
1−2β1
1+α2−β1 ,
1 If b1 > 2s−n2s−mb2, the unequal wage contract is optimal and e1 =
nb1+2sb2
mn−4s2 and e2 =
2sb1+mb2
mn−4s2 .
2 If b1 < 2s−n2s−mb2, the equal wage contract is optimal, and e1 = e2 =
b1+b2
2 + 2s.
Proof: The logic is identical to that for Proposition 1-2.
Ew1 = 11+α1−β2 (α1c(e2) + (1 − β2)c(e1)) and Ew2 = 11+α1−β2 ((1 + α1)c(e2) − β2c(e1))
The principal’s problem becomes
max
e1,e2
(b1 + se2)e1 + (b2 + se1)e2 − 2α2 + 11 + α2 − β1 c(e1) −
1 − 2β1
1 + α2 − β1 c(e2).
Let m = 2α2+1
α2−β1+1 and n =
1−2β1
1+α2−β1 . (It is easy to show that m > 1 > n.)
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The principal’s problem simplifies to max
e1,e2
b1e1 + b2e2 + 2se1e2 − m(e1)22 − n(e2)
2
2 .
1
Solving it yields e1 = nb1+2sb2mn−4s2 and e2 =
2sb1+mb2
mn−4s2 . Lemma 1-3 shows that e1 >
e2.and so b1 > 2s−n2s−mb2.
Therefore, if b1 > 2s−n2s−mb2, the unequal wage contract is optimal.
If b1 < 2s−n2s−mb2, the equal wage contract is optimal.
A.10 Corollary 1-4
Corollary 1-4 Suppose the synergy effect increases level of productions among work-
ers, i.e., xi = biei + S e j + i i = 1, 2. When b1 + S > 1+2α21−2β1 (b2 + S )
and S > S 1, the principal will implement an unequal wage contract which
implements efforts

e1 =
1+α2−β1
1+2α2
(b1 + S )
e2 =
1+α2−β1
1−2β1 (b2 + S )
and S > S 2,obtains profit Π1 =
1+α2−β1
2 (
(b1+S )2
1+2α2
+
(b2+S )2
1−2β1 ); 2. when b2 + S ≤ b1 + S ≤ 1+2α21−2β1 (b2 + S ) and the
principal will implement an equal wage contract which implements efforts: e1 =
e2 = b1+b22 + S and obtains profit Π2 =
1
4 (b1 + b2 + 2S )
2 .3. When S < S 2, the
firm will have two independent contractors and implement efforts ei = bi, i = 1, 2
and obtains Π0 =
b21
2 +
b22
2 .
The proof is Omitted since the analysis is identical to the proof of proposition
1-2.
1To guarantee existence of interior solution, the Hessian matrix must be negative definite. I
assume that mn − 4s2 > 0.
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A.11 Proof of Lemma 1-5
Lemma 1-5 If agents are inequity averse to differences in cost of efforts, wage and effort
levels are more compressed than in the benchmark case.
Proof: If agents are inequity averse to differences in cost of efforts, utility
function becomes
Ui = wi − c(ei) − αimax(c(ei) − c(e j), 0) − βimax(c(e j) − c(ei), 0).
Similar analysis to Lemma 1-2 can be applied, so (IRi) i = 1, 2 are binding.
If e1 > e2, from EU1 = Ew1 − c(e1) − α1(c(e1) − c(e2)) = 0 it follows Ew1 =
(1 + α1)c(e1) − α1c(e2), From EU2 = Ew2 − c(e2) − β2(c(e1) − c(e2)) = 0 it follows
Ew2 = (1 − β2)c(e2) + β2c(e1)
The principal’s objective function becomes
max
e1,e2
b1e1 + b2e2 − (1 + α1)c(e1) + α1c(e2) − (1 − β2)c(e2) − β2c(e1)
or max
e1,e2
b1e1 + b2e2 − (1 + α1 + β2)c(e1) − (1 − α1 − β2)c(e2)
Solving this solution yields

c′(e1) = b1(1+α1+β2)
c′(e2) = b2(1−α1−β2)
.
Since e1 > e2, it follows c′(e1) > c′(e2),i.e., b11+α1+β2 >
b2
1−α1−β2 .
So if b1 >
1+α1+β2
1−α1−β2b2, then

eC1 =
b1
1+α1+β2
eC2 =
b2
1−α1−β2
.
It is straightforward to see that eB2 < e
C
2 < e
C
1 < e
B
1 or
eC1 −eC2
eB1−eB2
< 1, i.e., the efforts
are more compressed than the benchmark case.
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If e1 < e2, from EU1 = Ew1 − c(e1) − β1(c(e2) − c(e1)) = 0, it follows Ew1 =
(1 − β1)c(e1) + β1c(e2). From EU2 = Ew2 − c(e2) − α2(c(e2) − c(e1)) = 0, it follows
Ew2 = (1 + α2)c(e2) − α2c(e1).
The principal’s objective function becomes
max
e1,e2
b1e1 + b2e2 − (1 − β1)c(e1) − β1c(e2) − (1 + α2)c(e2) + α2c(e1)
or max
e1,e2
b1e1 + b2e2 − (1 − α2 − β1)c(e1) − (1 + α2 + β1)c(e2)
If e1 < e2, then c′(e1) < c′(e2), i.e., b1 <
(1−α2−β1)b2
1+α2+β1
contradicts b1 > b2.
Therefore, if b1 <
1+α1+β2
1−α1−β2b2, e1 = e2 =
b1+b2
2 , and Ew1 = Ew2 =
1
8 (b1 + b2)
2
Under both cases, the wages and efforts are more compressed.
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 2 OF APPENDIX
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2-1
Proposition 2-1 The inter-rank prize is the same for the previous N − 1 rounds
wk+1 − wk = (1 − 1n )(wN − wN−1) + c
∗, where k = 1, 2, ...,N − 2.
The inter-rank prize for the last round is greater than the inter-rank prize for the
previous rounds
w2 − w1 = w3 − w2 = w4 − w3 = ... = wN−1 − wN−2 < wN − wN−1.
Proof: To induce the same level effort level in each round, the prize for win-
ning each round should be the same. Winning round k, except for the last round
N, involves two prizes. One is the direct monetary reward from winning round
k, i.e.,wk − wk−1. The other prize is the expected value from the possibility of
winning subsequent rounds. According to the above reasoning, the prize from
winning round N − 1 is the direct monetary prize, wN−1 −wN−2, and the expected
value of winning round N, 1n (wN −wN−1)− c∗. The sum of these two prizes equals
the prize from winning round N,
wN−1 − wN−2 + 1n (wN − wN−1) − c
∗ = wN − wN−1.
Expressing the direct prize from winning round N − 1 in terms of the prize from
winning round N, we have
wN−1 − wN−2 = (1 − 1n )(wN − wN−1) + c
∗. (B.1)
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Analogously, the prize from winning round N−2 equals the prize from winning
round N,
wN−2 − wN−3 + 1n [wN−1 − wN−2 +
1
n
(wN − wN−1) − c∗] − c∗ = wN − wN−1.
Substituting (B.1) into the above equation yields
wN−2 − wN−3 = (1 − 1n )(wN − wN−1) + c
∗.
Repeating this procedure yields the following equation that
w2 − w1 = ... = wN−2 − wN−3 = (1 − 1n )(wN − wN−1) + c
∗. (B.2)
Hence, the direct monetary prize is the same for all the rounds except the last
round. If we compare the direct monetary prize of the last round with the direct
monetary prize of the previous rounds:
(wN − wN−1) − (wk − wk−1) = 1n (wN − wN−1) − c
∗, where k = 1, 2, ...,N − 1. (B.3)
It is obvious that 1n (wN − wN−1) − c∗ > 0. Otherwise, workers have no incentive to
exert effort in the last round.
Therefore, it follows (B.2) and (B.3) that the prize from winning increases
constantly with a sharp increase in the final prize, which is constant with the
result in Rosen (1986).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2-1
Lemma 2-1 Let β = 1n− p
′(e∗)
c′(e∗) c
∗. VN = wN; Vk = βVk+1+(1−β)wk,where k = 1, ...,N−1.
Proof: When only one round remains to be played, the worker chooses his
effort eN , the probability for the worker to enter the final round is p(eN |e−N). If
98
he wins the final found, his payoff is wN − c(eN). If he loses the final round, his
payoff is wN−1 − c(eN), therefore, the Bellman equation for worker in round N is
VN−1 = max
eN
{(1 − p(eN |e−N))wN−1 + p(eN |e−N)wN − c(eN)}.
First order condition yields p′(eN |e−N)(wN−wN−1) = c′(eN). Second order condition
p′′(eN |e−N) c′(eN )p′(eN |e−N ) − c′′(eN) < 0 is always satisfied because p′′() < 0, c′′() > 0, p′() >
0 and c′() > 0.As discussed above, a symmetric equilibrium yields eN = e−N = e∗,
c(e∗) = c∗ and p(eN |e−N) = 1n . So the inter-rank spread is wN−wN−1 = c
′(e∗)
p′(e∗) . Plugging
it to the VN−1, we obtain
VN−1 = (1 − 1n )wN−1 +
1
n
wN − c∗ = wN−1 + 1n
c′(e∗)
p′(e∗)
− c∗. (B.4)
Let β = 1n − p
′(e∗)
c′(e∗) c
∗. It follows that c∗ = (1n − β) c
′(e∗)
p′(e∗) = (
1
n − β)(wN − wN−1).
Therefore, we can rewrite (B.4) as
VN−1 = βwN + (1 − β)wN−1 = βVN + (1 − β)wN−1.
Analogously,
Vk = max
ek+1
{(1 − p(ek+1|e−(k+1))wk + p(ek+1|e−(k+1))Vk+1 − c(ek+1)}.
First order condition yields p′(ek+1|e−(k+1))(Vk+1 −wk) = c′(ek+1). Second order con-
dition p′′(ek+1|e−(k+1)) c′(ek+1)p′(ek+1 |e−(k+1)) − c′′(ek+1) < 0 is always satisfied because p′′() < 0,
c′′() > 0, p′() > 0 and c′() > 0. Rearranging first order condition and substituting
ek+1 = e∗ yields Vk+1 − wk = c′(e∗)p′(e∗) .
Substituting c∗(≡ ( 1n − β) c
′(e∗)
p′(e∗) ) = (
1
n − β)(Vk+1 − wk) to Vk = (1 − 1n )wk + 1nVk+1 −
c∗ yields
Vk = (1 − 1n )wk +
1
n
Vk+1 − (1n − β)(Vk+1 − wk) = βVk+1 + (1 − β)wk.
99
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2-2
Proposition 2-2 The inter-rank prize is the same for the previous N − 1 rounds, i.e.,
wk − wk−1 = (1 − 1n )
c′(e∗)
p′(e∗)
+ c∗, k = 1, 2, ...,N − 1
The inter-rank prize for the last round is wN − wN−1 = c′(e∗)p′(e∗) .
(wN − wN−1) − (wk − wk−1) = 1n
c′(e∗)
p′(e∗)
− c∗ > 0 since β = 1
n
− p
′(e∗)
c′(e∗)
c∗ > 0.
Therefore the inter-rank prizes are the same for previous N − 1 rounds with an
increase in round N.
w2 − w1 = w3 − w2 = w4 − w3 = ... = wN−1 − wN−2 < wN − wN−1.
Proof: As proved in Lemma 2-2, wN − wN−1 = c′(e∗)p′(e∗) and VN−1 − wN−2 = c
′(e∗)
p′(e∗) .
Substituting (B.4) to the above equation, we obtain wN−1 −wN−2 = (1− 1n ) c
′(e∗)
p′(e∗) + c
∗.
From Lemma 2-1, VN−1 = βwN + (1 − β)wN−1 and Vk = βVk+1 + (1 − β)wk, k =
1, ...,N − 1.
By iteration, VN−2 = β2(wN − wN−1) + β(wN−1 − wN−2) + wN−2. Repeating the
iteration, we derive
Vk+1 = βN−k−1(wN − wN−1) + βN−k+1(wN−1 − wN−2) + ... + β(wk+2 − wk+1) + wk+1. (B.5)
Vk = βN−k(wN − wN−1) + βN−k+1(wN−1 − wN−2) + ... + β(wk+1 − wk) + wk. (B.6)
It follows from (B.6)−wk−1 − β ∗ (B.5) − wk), we have Vk − wk−1 − β(Vk+1 − wk) =
wk − wk−1. Substituting Vk+1 − wk = Vk − wk−1 = c′(e∗)p′(e∗) and β = 1n − p
′(e∗)
c′(e∗) c
∗ into the
above equation, we obtain wk − wk−1 = (1 − 1n ) c
′(e∗)
p′(e∗) + c
∗. k = 1, 2, ...,N − 1.
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B.4 Proof of Lemma 2-4
Lemma 2-4 Vk = βk+1Vk+1 + (1 − βk+1)wk, where
βk+1 =
1
n
− c(e
∗
k+1)p
′(e∗k+1)
c′(e∗k+1)
, k = 1, 2, ...,N − 1.
Proof:
VN = wN; VN−1 = max
eN
{p(eN |e−N)VN + (1 − p(eN |e−N))wN−1 − c(eN)}
FOC ⇒ p′(eN)(wN − wN−1) − c′(eN) = 0.
⇒ yN ≡ wN − wN−1 =
c′(e∗N)
p′(e∗N)
(B.7)
c∗N = (wN − wN−1) p
′(e∗N )c
∗
N
c′(e∗N )
. Let βN = 1n −
p′(e∗
N
)c(e∗N )
c′(e∗
N
) .
c∗N = (
1
n
− βN)(wN − wN−1) (B.8)
VN−1 =
1
n
wN + (1 − 1n )wN−1 − c
∗
N (B.9)
Substituting (B.8) into (B.9) yields
VN−1 = 1n (wN + wN−1) − ( 1n − βN)(wN − wN−1) = βNwN + (1 − βN)wN−1.
Analogously, Vk = max
ek+1
{p(ek+1|e−(k+1))Vk+1 + (1 − p(ek+1|e−(k+1)))wk − c(ek+1)}.
FOC yields p′(e∗k+1)(Vk+1 − wk) − c′(e∗k+1) = 0
⇒ Vk+1 − wk =
c′(e∗k+1)
p′(e∗k+1)
(B.10)
⇒ c(e∗k+1) = p
′(e∗k+1)c(e
∗
k+1)
c′(e∗k+1)
(Vk+1 − wk)
Let βk+1 = 1n −
p′(e∗k+1)c(e
∗
k+1)
c′(e∗k+1)
. So c(e∗k+1) = (
1
n − βk+1)(Vk+1 −wk) and Vk = 1nVk+1 + (1 −
1
n )wk − c(e∗k+1). It follows that Vk = βk+1Vk+1 + (1 − βk+1)wk.
101
B.5 Proof of Corollary 2-1
Corollary 2-1
wN − wN−1 =
c′(e∗N)
p′(e∗N)
;
wk−1 − wk−2 =
c′(e∗k−1)
p′(e∗k−1)
− 1
n
c′(e∗k)
p′(e∗k)
+ c(e∗k), k = 3, ...,N.
Proof: Let yk ≡ wk − wk−1.
From the Lemma 2-4, by iteration, we have
Vk = βk+1βk+2...βNyN + βk+1βk+2...βN−1yN−1 + ... + βk+1yk+1 + wk (B.11)
Vk−1 = βkβk+1...βNyN + ... + βkβk+2...βN−1yN−1 + ... + βkyk + wk−1 (B.12)
(B.12)−wk−2 − βk((B.11)−wk−1)
⇒ Vk−1 − wk−2 − βk(Vk − wk−1) = yk−1
Substituting (B.10) and βk = 1n −
p′(e∗k)c(e
∗
k)
c′(e∗k)
yield yk−1 =
c′(e∗k−1)
p′(e∗k−1)
− 1n
c′(e∗k)
p′(e∗k)
+ c(e∗k).
B.6 Proof of Corollary 2-3
Corollary 2-3 If the returns to effort increase with the hierarchical level, if the cost
function of effort is quadratic: c(ek) = b(ek)2, where b (> 0) is a constant, and if
output yk is linear in effort yk = ek + k, where k follows an uniform distribution
in range [−a, a] with mean 0, k = 1, 2, ...,N, then the optimal wage structure is
convex if the following condition is satisfied: e∗k + e
∗
k−1 ≥ 4an where k = 3, ...,N.
Proof:
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Pr(yi > y j) = Pr(ei + i > e j +  j) = Pr(i >  j + e j − ei)
=
∫
Pr(i >  j + e j − ei| j = x) f (x)dx =
∫
Pr(i > x + e j − ei) f (x)dx
=
∫
(1 − F(x + e j − ei)) f (x)dx.
∂Pr(yi > y j)
∂ei
=
∫
f (x + e j − ei)) f (x)dx.
Nash equilibrium suggests that e j = ei , so p′(e∗k) =
∫
f 2(x)dx = 12a .
∂2 Pr(yi>y j)
∂e2i
=
∫
(− f ′(x + e j − ei)) f (x)dx, so p′′(e∗k) = −
∫
f ′(x) f (x)dx. ( f ′(x) =
0, p′′(e∗k) = 0.)
Substituting c(ek) = b(ek)2 and p′(e∗k) =
1
2a into the second condition in Propo-
sition 2-4
c′(e∗k−1)
p′(e∗k−1)
− c
′(e∗k−2)
p′(e∗k−2)
− 1
n
(
c′(e∗k)
p′(e∗k)
− c
′(e∗k−1)
p′(e∗k−1)
) + c(e∗k) − c(e∗k−1) > 0.
We derive that
4ab(e∗k−1 − e∗k−2) − 4abn (e∗k − e∗k−1) + b(e∗k − e∗k−1)(e∗k + e∗k−1) > 0.
From Corollary 2-2, it is sufficient to have that
c(e∗k) − c(e∗k−1) − (
1
n
c′(e∗k)
p′(e∗k)
− 1
n
c′(e∗k−1)
p′(e∗k−1)
) = b(e∗k + e
∗
k−1 −
4a
n
)(e∗k − e∗k−1) ≥ 0,
which holds if and only if e∗k + e
∗
k−1 >
4a
n .
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CHAPTER 3 OF APPENDIX
C.1 Figure 3-1
Figure 3-1 Histogram of whether subjects had higher CE for G1
or higher CE for G2
Notes: The numbers in the parentheses are the corresponding percentage of sub-
jects.
Figure 3-1 summarizes the directions of their preferences with respect to ex
post fairness concern. For example, The figure shows that 12 subjects (10% of
122 subjects) had higher CE for (G1) in QP1 (($0, $0) with 50% and ($10, $10)
with 50%) than CE for (G2) in QP1 (($0, $10) with 50% and ($10, $0)) with 50%),
while 23 subjects behaved otherwise. Note that a majority of people (71%) had
the same CE for (G1) and (G2).
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C.2 Table 3-1
Table 3-1 Basic demographic information
Mean Standard deviation min max
Age 35 13 19 66
Fraction of subjects
Male 27%
Econ major or minor 7%
Political views
Democrats 56%
Republicans 10%
Others 34%
Notes: 122 observations in total.
C.3 Table 3-2
Table 3-2 CE for each question and differential in each question pair.
Mean CE Differential
Question Pair 1 G1 (($0,$0) with 50% and 6.21 -
($0,$0) with 50% (.246)
G2 ($0,$10) with 50% and 6.54 -.33∗
($10, $0)) with 50% (.228) (.187)
Question Pair 2 G1 ($10,$10) with 50% and 14.16
($20, $20)) with 50% (.326)
G2 ($10,$20) with 50% and 14.61 -.45∗
($20, $10)) with 50% (.317) (.257)
Question Pair 3 G1 ($15,$15) with 50% and 20.82
($30, $30)) with 50% (.455)
G2 ($15,$30) with 50% and 21.69 -.87∗∗∗
($30, $15) with 50% (.439) (.320)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The differential is the difference of the mean
CE for G1 and mean CE for G2. ∗ p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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C.4 Table 3-3
Table 3-3 Predicted frequency if subjects behave independently across QPs
Number of subjects 0 out of 3 QPs 1 out of 3 QPs 2 out of 3 QPs 3 out of 3 QPs
Higher CE for G1 85 (70%) 33 (27%) 4 (3%) 0 (0%)
The same 4 (3%) 26 (21%) 54 (44%) 38 (31%)
Higher CE for G2 60 (49%) 48 (39%) 13 (11%) 1 (1%)
Notes: The numbers in the parentheses are the corresponding percentages of sub-
jects. The percentages of each row sum to 100%.
C.5 Table 3-4
Table 3-4 Observed frequency across QPs
Number of subjects 0 out of 3 QPs 1 out of 3 QPs 2 out of 3 QPs 3 out of 3 QPs
Higher CE for G1 91 (75%) 25 (20%) 2 (2%) 4 (3%)
The same 14 (11%) 20 (16%) 35 (29%) 53 (43%)
Higher CE for G2 78 (64%) 20 (16%) 16 (13%) 8 (7%)
Notes: The numbers in the parentheses are the percentage of subjects. The percent-
ages of each row sum to 100%.
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C.6 Table 3-5
Table 3-5 Comparison of predicted preferences and the observed preferences
\
Table 3-5 shows the p-value of Fisher’s exact test. According to the p-value
of Fisher’s exact test, the second and the third comparisons strongly reject the
null hypothesis that subjects behaved randomly across the question pairs. Col-
lectively, table 3-5 indicates a strong rejection of the null hypothesis. Hence, the
subjects behaved consistently across the question pairs.
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C.7 Table 3-6
Table 3-6: Regression of CE on question pairs and demographic characteristics
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗p < 0.05,∗∗∗p < 0.01. Age: 1:
18-24; 2: 25-34; 3: 35-44; 4: 45-54; 5: 55-64; 6: 65 or older.
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C.8 Table 3-7
Table 3-7 Priming effects within subjects by comparing CE for (G1) and (G2)
($0, $0)50% prob
and ($10, $10)50% prob
($0, $10)50% prob
and ($10, $0)50% prob differential p-value
PQ1 mean CE(control) 6.04 6.47 −.43 .1054
mean CE
(ex post) 6.22 6.43 −.21 .5787
mean CE
(ex ante) 6.42 6.74 −.32 .3727
PQ2 ($10, $10)50% proband ($20, $20)50% prob
($10, $20)50% prob
and ($20, $10)50% prob differential p-value
mean CE
(control) 14.13 14.77 −.64 .1411
mean CE
(ex post) 14.38 14.05 .32 .4677
mean CE
(ex ante) 14.00 14.95 −.95 .0425
PQ3 ($15, $15)50% proband ($30, $30)50% prob
($15, $30)50% prob
and ($30, $15)50% prob differential p-value
mean CE
(control) 20.94 21.96 −1.02 .0569
mean CE
(ex post) 20.92 21.24 −.32 .5597
mean CE
(ex ante) 20.58 21.79 −1.21 .0497
Notes: There are 47 observations in the control group, 37 observations in the ex post
treatment group and 38 observations in the ex ante treatment group.
C.9 Table 3-8
Table 3-8 CE for (G2) between subjects
Mean CE Control group(47 observations)
Ex post treatment
37 observations
Ex ante treatment
38 observations
($0, $10) with 50% prob 6.47 6.43 6.73
and ($10, $0) with 50% prob (.400) (.400) (.388)
($10, $20) with 50% prob 14.77 14.05 14.95
and ($20, $10) with 50% prob (.539) (.556) (.553)
($15, $30) with 50% prob 21.96 21.24 21.78
and ($30, $15) with 50% prob (.730) (.750) (.815)
Notes: The numbers in the parentheses are standard errors.
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C.10 Table 3-9
Table 3-9 Priming effects by comparing CE for (G2) between subjects
Panel A Priming effects by comparing CE for (G2) in QP 1 between subjects
($0, $10) with 50% and
($10, $0) with 50% Control group Ex ante group Ex post group
Control group − − −
Ex ante group .04(.9504) − −
Ex post group −.27(.6357) −.30(.5845) −
Panel B Priming effects by comparing CE for (G2) in QP 2 between subjects
($10, $20) with 50% and
($20, $10) with 50% Control group Ex ante group Ex post group
Control group − − −
Ex ante group .71(.3658) − −
Ex post group −.18(.8164) −.89(.2584) −
Panel C Priming effects by comparing CE for (G2) in QP 3 between subjects
($15, $30) with 50% and
($30, $15) with 50% Control group Ex ante group Ex post group
Control group − − −
Ex ante group .71(.5018) − −
Ex post group .17(.8784)
−.55
(.6236) −
Notes: The p-value in the parentheses.
C.11 Table 3-10
Table 3-10 Some demographic studies of ex post fairness
Panel A Ex post fairness by gender Panel B Ex post fairness by education
t statistics p-value
α1 6.68 21.72 0.000
(.308)
α2 14.69 47.73 0.000
(.308)
α3 21.56 70.03 0.000
(.308)
µ -.20 -2.04 0.042
(.544)
gender(male) -.13 -0.29 0.768
(.450)
µ ∗ gender 4.72 0.74 0.459
(6.37)
t statistics p-value
α1 6.60 17.15 0.000
(.385)
α2 14.62 37.93 0.000
(.385)
α3 21.49 55.76 0.000
(.385)
µ -.62 -1.34 .182
(.465)
education .07 .16 .874
(college or higher) (.414)
µ ∗ education .12 .20 .838
(.586)
Notes: The standard errors in the parentheses. 732 Observations.
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C.12 The upper bound of the ex post fairness concern
The insignificance may be due to the coarseness of our data and the fact that the values of
the options are not continuous. Therefore, I also test the upper bound of the ex post fairness
concern. In other words, I choose the lowest value of the certainty equivalent interval as their
certainty equivalent for the ex post unfair alternative and the highest value of the certainty
equivalent interval as their certainty equivalent for the ex post fair alternative. The results of
t-test is presented in Table 3-2. As can be seen from the table, the possible effects of the ex post
fairness concerns are statistically significant.
Mean CE Differential
($0, $0) with 50% and ($10, $10) with 50% 6.21(.246) -
($0, $10) with 50% and ($0, $10) with 50% 4.54(.228)
1.67
(.0000)
($10, $10) with 50% and ($20, $20) with 50% 13.16(.326) -
($10, $20) with 50% and ($20, $10) with 50% 11.61(.317)
1.55
(.0000)
($15, $15) with 50% and ($30, $30) with 50% 19.82(.455) -
($15, $30) with 50% and ($30, $15) with 50% 18.69(.439)
1.13
(.0006)
Notes: The numbers in the parentheses in the second row are standard errors. The
number in the parentheses in the third row are p-value.
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C.13 A sample survey
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